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Abstract 
Applying the market metaphor the first part of the article outlines a conceptual model 
for assessing the efficiency of the Russian political system. In the Russian transitional 
context the development of democracy also has to be included in such an assessment. 
Using Robert Dahl’s classic criteria of democracy and Douglass C. North’s factors 
determining transaction costs a scheme is suggested for assessing the efficiency of the 
Russian political market, looking at the structure of this market as well as actors’ 
behaviour (agency). In the second part of the article, essential structural developments 
of the Russian political market are analysed and the implications of these developments 
are discussed. The conclusion is that a number of recent reforms affecting the structure 
of the Russian political market will improve the prerequisites for efficiency of citizens’ 
participation in political life. Finally, the usefulness of applying the market metaphor in 
analyses of the political system is discussed. 
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Assessing the Structural Prerequisites 
for an Efficient Russian Political Market 
Mats-Olov Olsson  
Democracy is a device that ensures we shall be  
governed no better than we deserve.  
(George Bernard Shaw) 
1 Introduction 
Arguably, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which actually started long before 
1991, and the subsequent transition period in Russia aiming at transforming the 
crumbling command economy into a modern market system, was the most important 
geo-political event of the 20th century and its repercussions are still very much 
influencing world developments today.  
Through a series of far-reaching reforms, changes were introduced not only in the 
institutions governing business behaviour in Russia, but also in the structure and 
functioning of the political system, a process that has become known as the dual transi-
tion. The ambitious and utterly complex goal of simultaneously converting the Soviet 
economic and political system into a democratic market economy based on private 
ownership was fraught with a high risk of failure, which caused deep concern among 
reformers and observers early on in the transition process (Sukhotin & Dement’ev, 
1991; Kuz’minov et al., 1993; Elster, 1993; Ordeshook, 1995; Frye, 2003). Severe 
problems have constantly been encountered along the road forcing the political 
leadership to change policies during implementation and to devise new policies to 
remedy the problems created by previous reforms, thus increasing the uncertainty that 
actors in society have had to cope with, ultimately reducing people’s expectations of a 
positive future and jeopardizing the legitimacy of the entire reform program.  
The fundamental problem that has to be solved in the dual economic and political 
transition in Russia is how to change the institutional framework that evolved in the 
Soviet period to make it conducive to the emergence and efficient functioning of a 
market economy and a democratic political system. Douglass North (1997:2) briefly 
defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they struc-
ture incentives in exchange, whether political, social, or economic.” Institutions should 
be distinguished from organizations, the former being the rules of the game, the latter 
“groups of individuals bound together by a common objective function (economic 
organizations are firms, trade unions, cooperatives; political organizations are political 
parties, legislative bodies, etc.)” (p. 1).  
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North (1997) further argues that institutions are essential for the creation and operation 
of efficient markets underlying economic growth. Good institutions should provide 
“low-cost transacting” in economic as well as political markets. Four “major variables” 
determine these so-called transaction costs. First, there are costs incurred in measuring 
the “valuable attributes of the goods and services or the performance of agents in 
exchange.” Secondly, transaction costs depend upon the size of the market and whether 
exchange is personal or impersonal. In personal exchange, where the need for detailed 
specification of what is being exchanged and enforcement of contracts have to be 
detailed, transaction costs are higher than in impersonal exchange, where competition 
guarantees more efficient transactions. Thirdly, transaction costs increase with the need 
for enforcement of contracts in situations where parties come to dispute the conditions 
of exchange. In well-established market economies an elaborate legal system has 
allowed the development of “a complex system of contracting that can extend over time 
and space, an essential requirement for a world of specialization” (p. 3). In North’s 
conception, the fourth variable determining transaction costs has to do with ideology 
(North, 1997:3): 
Ideology, consisting of the subjective ‘models’ individuals possess to explain and evaluate 
the world around them, not only plays an essential role in political choices, but also is a key 
to individual choices that affect economic performance. Individual perceptions about the 
fairness and justice of the rules of the game obviously affect performance; otherwise we 
would be at a loss to explain a good deal of schooling, as well as the immense investment 
made by politicians, employers, labour leaders, and others in trying to convince participants 
of the fairness or unfairness of contractual arrangements. The importance of ideology is a 
direct function of the degree to which the measurement and enforcement of contracts are 
costly. If the measurement and enforcement of contract performance can be done at low 
cost, then it makes very little difference whether people believe the rules of the game are 
fair or unfair. But because measurement and enforcement are costly, ideology matters. 
Thus, to summarize, efficient markets are impersonal and exchange is characterized by 
low transaction costs, that is, parties to an exchange incur minimal costs for quality 
measurements and contract enforcement, and they trust the fairness (and enforceability) 
of the rules governing the exchange. In this conception, institutional change aims at 
installing new or modified rules that contribute to transaction cost decrease. The 
problem of how to achieve such change is still largely unresolved. Previous research on 
the transformation of the Russian forest sector (see, for instance, Carlsson, Lundgren & 
Olsson, 2001; Olsson, 2006) identified a number of institutional deficiencies hampering 
the efficiency of actors’ behaviour on the “timber procurement arena”.1 It was also 
found that the further development of a market efficient Russian forest sector would be 
facilitated by ― in fact, would even require ― an improved functioning of the Russian 
political system.  
                                                 
1 This research was conducted by a small group of researchers (of which the present author was a 
member) at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the period 1997–2001. 
Work was subsequently continued by the present author in his home institute, the Centre for Regional 
Science of Umeå University, Sweden. A complete listing of reports published by the IIASA project can 
be found at http://www.didaktekon.se/mats/ii-publ.htm. Information about IIASA can be obtained from 
the institute’s website at http://www.iiasa.ac.at. 
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1.1 Purpose and Structure of the Article 
In this article I seek to structure the complex problem area relating to the functioning of 
the Russian political system and to outline a framework for assessing the efficiency of 
actors’ political interaction, focusing on the rules (institutions) governing behaviour in 
the Russian political market. In so doing, I take the departure in Douglass North’s 
writings on what drives institutional change and what makes the functioning of the 
political market so important.  
In the first part of the article I set out by summarizing some recent thoughts developed 
by North and colleagues on what drives institutional change. In a following section I 
discuss the meaning of the political market concept and what might be understood by 
efficiency in the context of such a market. Next, a set of criteria is distinguished, by 
which the efficiency of actors’ behaviour in the political market can be assessed. It is 
argued that both the way Russian political life is structured and the way the actors of the 
system behave must be taken into account when assessing the efficiency of the 
country’s political market.  
In the second part of the article, I use recent research findings to exemplify some of the 
changes in the structure of the Russian political market that seem most important with 
respect to its potential efficiency. In the concluding section it is discussed to what extent 
the Russian political market has become more or less democratic and efficient since the 
beginning of the 1990s. It will also be possible to draw some conclusions about what 
features of this development are insufficiently understood and thus in need of further 
study. Finally, the usefulness of applying the market metaphor for assessing political 
processes is ascertained.  
2 Theoretical Approach 
2.1 What Is Driving Institutional Change? 
Improving the efficiency in actors’ market behaviour ― be it in the economic or in the 
political market ― requires changes in the institutional framework. Thus, the crucial 
question is: how do institutions change? And, much more specifically and relevant for 
this article, in what way must institutions change in order to contribute to decreased 
transaction costs? In recent writings North has emphasized the importance of the 
cognitive processes behind individual and collective learning and how such learning 
manifests itself in the emergence of institutions (cf., Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 
2004; North, 2005).  
When theorizing about institutions, it is useful to distinguish between two aspects: external 
and internal.  
 From an external point of view, institutions are shared behavioral regularities or shared 
routines within a population. From an internal point of view, they are nothing more than 
shared mental models of shared solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction. Only 
because institutions are anchored in people’s minds do they ever become behaviorally 
relevant. The elucidation of the internal aspect is the crucial step in adequately explaining 
the emergence, evolution, and effects of institutions; it is this that makes for the qualitative 
difference between a cognitive approach to institutions and other approaches (Mantzavinos, 
North & Shariq, 2004:77). 
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For the further discussion, it is important to note that institutions consist of “formal 
rules (constitutions, statute and common law, and regulations), informal rules 
(conventions, moral rules, and social norms), and the enforcement characteristics of 
each” (Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004:77). Informal rules emerge spontaneously in 
the interaction among members of a social group in a process of collective learning. The 
emergence of formal rules has to do with the necessity of coming to grips with 
individuals (or groups) who do not abide by the established informal rules. Such 
behaviour is more likely to appear in large groups where impersonal relationships 
between members dominate, rather than in small groups (tribes and the like). 
Mantzavinos, North & Shariq (2004:78) present an argument explaining the emergence 
of states as an evolutionary response to the need for protection that appears in large 
impersonal groups:  
Thus, in an evolutionary process characterized by collective learning, division of labor, and 
competition or cooperation among entrepreneurs, one or more protective agencies remain in 
the society. Since their primary function is to offer protection in exchange for goods or 
money, they constitute the protective state or states taxing constituents for the supplied 
protection. But isn’t there any difference between protective agencies and protective states? 
The only analytically important one seems to be that protective agencies appear at the first 
stages of the evolutionary process, whereas protective states are, in a way, the outcome of 
that process. Greater stability is characteristic of the protective state, since both rulers and 
citizens have already gone through a learning process. Citizens have realized that the costs 
of exiting a protective state are quite high […]; and rulers have learned how other rulers 
react and which technologies of oppression are most successful. The difference is therefore 
one of degree rather than of kind. 
The authors further maintain (p. 79) that, despite recent progress in political science, 
there does not yet exist any “general theory of how political markets work and how 
protective states come to assume more and more functions, offering a bundle of public 
goods rather than merely protection”. In their opinion such a general theory would 
“explore the transaction-cost characteristics of political markets and the role of ideology 
in shaping political outcomes”. The development of a theory of ideology, the authors 
suggest, “could have as a starting point the evolution of the shared mental models of the 
political actors that give rise to and legitimize new political rules.” 
Finally, one more notion of central importance for North’s conception of institutional 
change should be mentioned. This is the notion of path dependence, a concept denoting 
rigidities preventing fast or drastic changes in established behaviour. Mantzavinos, 
North & Shariq (2004) speak of cognitive, institutional and economic path dependence, 
where cognitive path dependence (that appears when “shared learning” repeatedly 
comes to the same result thus stabilizing mental models) leads to a path-dependent 
formation of institutions used to solve a variety of social problems in a particular way. 
This results in “increasing returns” of the institutional framework, creating disincentives 
for institutional change (institutional path dependence). A constant institutional frame-
work (entailing a stable incentive structure) will favour a certain type of technological 
development, which ultimately results in economic path dependence. The authors (p. 
81) end their article by calling for further research “in order to develop theories of how 
political markets function, of the emergence and effects of ideology, and of the relation 
between formal and informal institutions”. This article hopes to make a contribution to 
this research agenda.  
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2.2 The Political Market 
Drawing upon North (1990; 1997) this article sets out to study the efficiency of the 
political system in much the same way as one would do to assess the efficiency of the 
economic system, through changes in the costs of transaction. The criterion for 
improved efficiency is that interactions in the market can take place at reduced 
transaction costs, i.e., all costs relating to a market transaction, apart from the direct 
production costs of the commodities or services that are exchanged. This is 
understandable when we think of transactions in the market for goods and services. But 
what about transactions in the political market? First of all, what do we mean by a 
political market?  
The concept of market, as used in economic and political discourse, traditionally refers 
to an abstract (metaphorical) “place” where suppliers of a certain commodity or service 
meet potential customers to establish the minimal price at which the supplier is willing 
to cede the property rights of the commodity or service in his possession to the 
customer. Multiple suppliers and customers are assumed to compete in this idealization 
of a market. Prices thus established reflect scarcity relations between the commodities 
and services that are offered in the market. In a perfectly functioning market (another 
abstraction/idealization) such prices (and the profits they generate) will guide the 
producers in their efforts to make maximally profitable decisions concerning production 
and investments.  
Customers who want to buy a specific commodity or service has to monitor the supply 
of the product offered in the marketplaces in order to find an acceptable price relative to 
the desired quality and quantity. There are also a number of other issues that have to be 
resolved, issues that can broadly be labelled the terms of trade (time of delivery, forms 
of payment, enforcement of contracts, insurance, etc.). Expenditures (in time and 
money) related to such monitoring activities constitute transaction costs. Efficient 
markets are characterized by minimal transaction costs. In general, transactions 
conducted in large impersonal markets guided by well-functioning rule systems 
(institutions) incur lower transaction costs (i.e., are more efficient) than transactions in 
small, personalized markets.  
How can the economic market metaphor be applied to the field of politics?2 First, it is 
necessary to distinguish what it is that is being exchanged in political markets and who 
the parties to such transactions are. In general, the “products” exchanged in political 
markets are one way or another related to institutions (rules-in-use) that govern various 
aspects of people’s behaviour, often to the formation of such institutions (ideas and 
views suggesting new or modified rules-in-use), including the procedural rules 
governing how collectively decided institutions should be established. The “products” 
exchanged in political markets may be of a very general character, such as ideas and 
proposals for policies intended to impose restrictions applicable to all actors and spheres 
                                                 
2 Attempts at conceptualizing political activity as actors’ interaction in a marketplace has a fairly long 
history in economics, business studies, and political science. Downs (1957) is an often cited precursor of 
this line of research. In Monroe (1991) Downs’ legacy is reviewed and commented upon by a number of 
his followers and critics. For a recent overview of the theorizing on why, how, and with what 
consequences politics, conceived as interaction in a marketplace, can be influenced by various actors, see 
Getz (2002). The principal characteristics of political markets and their function has been outlined, e.g., 
by North (1990); Bonardi, Hillman & Keim (2005).  
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in society, but they may also be ideas or proposals for rules of more limited scope, rules 
intended to govern the behaviour of some actors (individual citizens and organizations) 
with regard to very specific issues. The “products” offered in the political market are 
paid for by “support” of the actor supplying the product. This payment may consist of 
electoral support (votes), information, or sometimes financial support for political 
campaigns, etc.  
In principle, we could expect to find the same actors in political markets as in economic 
markets. The ultimate actors in the political as well as in the economic system are 
individual citizens. But, depending upon the framing of the analysis, actors might be 
distinguished on various levels of aggregation, from individuals, to informal and more 
formal groups of individuals, such as households, enterprises, and other kinds of 
organizations (political parties, business associations, labour organizations, NGOs of 
various inclination, etc.).3  
Table 1 summarizes the principal differences between economic and political markets. 
Table 1. Comparison of Economic and Political Markets 
Characteristics  Economic Political 
Definition/boundary Substitute goods/services  Political issue 
   Demanders     Customers     Citizens, firms, interest groups,  
   voters, other governments  
   (foreign or subgovernments) 
   Suppliers     Firms, individuals     Elected and nonelected politicians,
   bureaucrats, legislators,  
   members of the judiciary 
   Product     Good, service     Public policy, regulation,  
   deregulation 
Nature of exchange Money, other goods (barter) Votes, information, financial 
support 
Source: Bonardi, Hillman & Keim (2005:400). 
A good starting point for comparing economic and political markets is to look at the 
character of the principal-agent relations that exist in the two kinds of market. In 
economic markets, the principal’s problem of making the agent behave in the desired 
way normally is viewed hierarchically and as an employer-employee relation, where 
enterprise owners recruit a CEO obliging him by contract to make the enterprise 
perform in the best interest of the owners (for simplicity let us assume that this means 
seeking to maximize profits). The CEO, in turn, is responsible for the recruitment of 
other enterprise employees under such conditions that profit maximization can be 
reached. This behaviour is institutionally embedded in provisions made in various 
legislative acts (e.g., constitutional stipulations on property rights and legislation 
                                                 
3 A substantial share of the literature on political markets deals with enterprises’ political activity under 
labels like “corporate political agency,” “issue management,” “Corporate Political Action Committees” 
(so-called PACs), etc.  
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regulating the labour market) with details relevant for individual instances laid down in 
contracts between the parties. This way principals know how to sanction irregular 
behaviour on the part of his agents and there are organizations (public and private) to 
settle disputes that might arise. The principal-agent relations in economic markets seen 
from the opposite perspective of a consumer ― the principal being the buyer of a 
product or service supplied by the agent, an enterprise ― is likewise embedded in a 
fairly clear and operational institutional framework.  
The institutional embedding of the principal-agent relations in operation in political 
markets is quite different. A fundamental difference compared to economic markets is 
that the political market is coercive in that the state extracts money for its operation 
from all taxpayers in the country. Citizens/taxpayers are thereby actors in this market 
whether they wish to be so or not. But as actors they have a right (and they ought to 
consider it important) to know that their tax payments come to best use. Furthermore, 
political markets are highly competitive and much of the interaction (exchange) in this 
market aims at forming coalitions to promote certain political goals, often entailing a 
temporally extended, recurring negotiation process, quite unlike the separable one-time 
deals that are concluded in economic markets. In the political market constitutional 
stipulations play a much greater role for the way these relations are enacted. A country’s 
constitution identifies political bodies in charge of the legislative, the executive and the 
controlling powers in society and it stipulates how these bodies are allowed to exercise 
the powers given them and through whom (i.e., requirements on officials and how these 
officials should be selected). The character of these constitutional rules also determines 
in what kind of governance (variants of democracy or dictatorship) these bodies are to 
function. In a democracy, which is what we will be dealing with here, the constitutional 
rules supplemented by other legislation define the form and character of the principal-
agent relations that are to apply between the central and regional authorities (rules 
defining federal relations), between citizens and their representatives to the parliament 
(rules governing political parties, electoral rules, procedural rules, etc.), between various 
officials of government and employees in governmental bodies (rules governing 
bureaucracy) (cf., Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997; Mitnick, 1993; Keim & Baysinger, 1993). 
Compared to the rules governing principal-agent relations in economic markets the rules 
governing these relations in political markets are more ambiguous and difficult to 
enforce. Obviously, there are instances of rule violations that are immediately 
recognized and for which there are clear and implementable sanctions. Political agents 
(such as elected members of parliament ― legislators) often behave in a way that their 
principals (citizens ― voters) would not approve of without the latter being able to 
enforce any sanctions at all against the former, at least no immediate sanctions.  
The reasons for such “market failures” are partly to be found in inadequacies in the 
system of rules guiding the behaviour of principals and agents, but partly also in the fact 
that transactions in the political market and the “products” exchanged are of a very 
different nature compared to those of economic markets. For instance, information 
necessary to reach decisions on transactions are harder to come by in political markets 
than what is normally the situation in economic markets. Typically, different actors in 
the political market have access to information of varying scope and quality 
(asymmetrical information). Add to this the fact that the “products” exchanged in 
political markets are of an entirely different character than products exchanged in 
economic markets. The ideas and promises of new or modified institutions that are the 
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“goods” traded in the political market often are of a public-good type, i.e., the benefits 
of the transaction (if they are eventually realized) in principle accrue to everybody in 
society, while the “cost” paid is often carried by a few. This makes political markets 
much more volatile than economic markets and developments in political markets are 
therefore also rather more difficult to predict. Actors in political markets are thus faced 
with greater uncertainty compared to actors in economic markets. Thus, the incentive 
structure of actors in political markets is quite different compared with that of actors in 
economic markets. 
All of the mentioned features characteristic of political markets tend to raise transaction 
costs. Clearly these costs will be high in political markets that are “immature” in the 
sense that well-functioning institutions (formal as well as informal rules) have not (yet) 
been established. However, it is reasonable to assume that in such markets (like in all 
markets) actors’ behaviour will change through a learning process that will ultimately 
affect actors’ “mental models” leading to (formal or informal) collective decisions on 
changes in the institutional framework that will make costs of transactions decrease, 
thus improving the efficiency of operations in political markets.  
2.3 Conceptualizing the Efficiency of the Russian Political Market 
Assessing the performance of the Russian political market necessarily entails a 
comparison of observed behaviour and its structural constraints with some kind of 
norm. The behaviour observed in another society could in principle serve as such a 
norm. However, that would not reveal anything about the position of the Russian 
political market in the total set of existing political markets.4 Another approach would 
be to construct a kind of “ideal-type” for comparison by defining from “first principles” 
a (theoretically) ideal political market. To enable an assessment we then need to 
identify, on the basis of this definition, a set of criteria that together normatively define 
a democratic political system, criteria against which the structure and functioning of the 
Russian political market can be assessed. This is the avenue chosen here.  
Robert Dahl (1971) has suggested several requirements that together might be used to 
define a kind of ideal-type democracy. Dahl (1971:2) argues that a democratic 
government must be responsive to the preferences of its citizens and allow them “unim-
paired opportunities” to formulate and signify preferences and have their preferences 
“weighted equally in conduct of government.” To allow these opportunities Dahl lists a 
number of guarantees that citizens must be given:  
1. Freedom to form and join organizations; 
2. Freedom of expression; 
3. Right to vote; 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support; 
6. Alternative sources of information; 
7. Free and fair elections; 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preferences. 
                                                 
4 Unless, of course, it had already been established what relative position in the total set of existing 
political markets that specific society occupied with which Russia was to be compared.  
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Dahl notes that two different “theoretical dimensions” emerge from this listing. 
Actually, the guarantees specify how public contestation should be achieved and they 
also indicate that the degree of participation (inclusiveness) in democracy may vary. By 
combining the two dimensions Dahl deducts four types of regimes that he uses to 
illustrate the process of democratization. One of these types he calls “polyarchy” 
characterized by high public contestation (liberalization) and high participation 
(inclusiveness). Systems characterized by low public contestation and low participation 
he calls “closed hegemonies”. Democratization consists in a movement from closed 
hegemony towards polyarchy, i.e., from low to high “values” on both the contestation 
and the participation axes.  
By observing how the Russian regime that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union ― Dahl notes that the Soviet regime was highly inclusive, but not allowing 
public contestation ― opens up to public contestation, the degree of democratization in 
Russia can be assessed. However, as Dahl also points out, a more complete 
characterization of democracy would require more dimensions than the two he 
explicitly discusses. Dahl’s characterization of democracy and democratization 
nevertheless indicates a number of criteria for assessing the development of Russian 
democracy, distinguishing whether or not the system is becoming more democratic with 
time, approaching what Dahl labels polyarchy.  
But the characterization also draws attention to the fact that in practice many different 
ways of implementing Dahl’s eight guarantees may exist, ways that could in principle 
produce a large number of unique variants of democracy. The functioning of these 
different democracy variants may be more or less efficient in terms of the transaction 
costs that are incurred in the operation of the system. Thus, in principle, an assessment 
of the efficiency of the Russian political market would need to establish the specific 
type of democracy (of all possible and acceptable variants) that would potentially incur 
the lowest transaction costs. The assessment would then consist in measuring the 
deviation between the actually existing variant of Russian democracy and the “optimal” 
variant that might potentially have been selected. (This issue could be seen as a parallel 
to the issue of allocative efficiency in economic markets.)  
However, in the present context, noting that democratization in Russia is increasing 
public contestation, the choice of democratic system (i.e., the selected variant of 
democracy) will not be questioned, it will rather be taken as a given, assuming that it 
represents people’s preferences. Nevertheless it must be noticed that the variant of 
“democracy” existing in Russia today has undergone structural changes since it was 
originally installed at the beginning of the 1990s and that these changes have 
presumably affected the transaction costs that actors incur in their operations in the 
Russian political market.  
Changes in actors’ behaviour in the political market might also be due to other (non-
structural) factors influencing transaction costs, such as changes in perceptions, 
incentives, ability to access and interpret information, etc., most of which might be said 
to be consequences of individual and/or collective learning. Thus, behavioural changes 
could take place independently of changes affecting the structure of the observed variant 
of democracy. And as a result of changed perceptions, the actors in a given political 
market might rearrange their capacities and efforts in a way that increases the efficiency 
of their operations (reduces their transaction costs). This issue could be seen as a 
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parallel to so-called X-efficiency in economic markets (Leibenstein, 1966), i.e., the issue 
of how best to use given resources in a given production structure. 
To sum up:  
Democracy is a system of governance allowing all citizens real influence over collective 
decisions about public affairs.  
A democratic political market is defined by the existence and enforcement of sets of 
rules, or institutional systems, that (a) establish a structure within which citizens can 
exercise their right to influence collective decisions, and (b) guide citizens’ actual 
behaviour when exercising that right. These institutional systems are themselves 
established (and can be changed) through citizens’ exercise of their rights to influence 
collective decisions.  
An efficient market is one in which actors’ behaviour incurs minimal transaction costs. 
With reference to political markets ― and based upon the four factors that North claims 
determine transaction costs (cf., Section 1 above) ― this would entail the following: 
1. Formal rules (institutions) exist that facilitate citizens’ assessment of the 
character and political programs of various market actors (politicians, bureau-
crats), i.e., rules that facilitate citizens’ decisions whether or not to support an 
actor or group of actors (e.g., a political party). 
2. Measures are taken to increase the size of the political market, making the 
political market more impersonal (or public), which tends to increase efficiency 
(by decreasing transaction costs).  
3. People have rights and capacities to assign responsibility for failures or mal-
performance of individual politicians or political parties.  
4. Collective learning exists that may result in changed (shared) mental models 
(ideology), with the help of which actors interpret their situation and decide on 
future actions.  
2.4 Assessing the Efficiency of Russia’s Political Market 
Assessing efficiency changes in the Russian political market in principle entails an 
attempt at answering two separate questions: (a) How have the structural prerequisites 
for the efficient operation of the Russian political market developed during transition? 
and (b) How have other prerequisites (such as those related to learning) affected actors’ 
behaviour in the Russian political market? The first question aims at establishing how 
the structure of the political market limits the potential efficiency of actors’ behaviour, 
the second question aims at estimating to what extent actors realize the efficiency gains 
(reduced transaction costs) that are feasible within the existing structural constraints.5 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that the discussion in this paper does not concern “politicized” economic markets. 
Such markets often seem to be the focus of interest when economists claim to be discussing the efficiency 
of political markets. Their discussions may, for instance, deal with the efficient collection and spending of 
tax revenues for the provision of “welfare” (health services, education, defence, etc.). It may also deal 
with the production of goods and services in markets where government regulation is making a significant 
impact on supply and demand relations, such as may be the case in certain production activities in the 
private sphere affected, for instance, by government’s environmental regulations (cf., for instance, 
Breton, 1999). 
 10
Thus, in principle, when assessing the efficiency of the Russian political market, both its 
structure and agency characteristics should be taken into account.6  
Dahl’s (1971) criteria, discussed in a previous section, mainly specify certain rights and 
freedoms that citizens should be guaranteed for the system of governance to be 
characterized as a democracy. They indicate principal ways through which citizens 
should be allowed to exercise their political power.  
By stating that there should be free and fair elections, Dahl indicates that citizens could 
exercise their power indirectly, through elected representatives. Implicitly he thereby 
also acknowledges that there must exist in a democracy a hierarchical organizational 
structure within which these representatives should operate. The final guarantee listed 
by Dahl speaks of the necessity of institutions to ensure that voters’ preferences be duly 
taken into consideration in government policies.  
Table 2. Institutional Criteria for an Efficient Political Market 
I.   The (formal) institutional set-up of an efficient democratic political market should:  
C1  establish citizens’ freedoms and rights to take certain actions, such as the freedom to 
form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public 
office, and right of political leaders to compete for support.  
C2  sanction the existence of certain resources and procedures in society, such as alternative 
sources of information, and free and fair elections. 
C3  impose certain restrictions on the conduct of government, such as institutions for 
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.  
C4  be internally consistent, i.e., rules must not be contradictory and give rise to incoherent 
behaviour.  
II.  In an efficient democratic political market the behaviour of a majority of actors should: 
C5  (a) conform to the behaviour sanctioned by established institutions,  
and/or  
(b) not be overly influenced by, or contributing to, corruption. 
By reformulating Dahl’s criteria in institutional terms we arrive at three kinds of rules 
that establish the structure of a democratic political market (cf., C1–C3 in Table 2). 
Dahl’s criteria also imply a hierarchical grouping of the institutions (rules-in-use) 
existing in a society. Typically, certain institutions limit the scope of others at lower 
levels in the hierarchy. Therefore, as suggested by Kiser & Ostrom (1982), it is useful to 
distinguish institutions operating at the constitutional choice level from institutions 
operating at the collective choice level, and from those that govern behaviour at the 
operational level. As explained by Kiser and Ostrom (1982:209): “Constitutional 
decisions establish institutional arrangements and their enforcement for collective 
choice. Collective decisions, in turn, establish institutional arrangements and their 
enforcement for individual action.” This observation leads us to a fourth “consistency” 
criterion (C4) with important implications for the efficiency of political markets. 
                                                 
6 Integrating the analysis of structure and agency has been suggested by, for instance, Sewell (1992); 
Mahoney & Snyder (1999); and, in the context of the post-soviet transition, by Jones Luong (2002).  
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Finally, the required character of actors’ behaviour in a democracy is specified in a fifth 
criterion (C5).  
Under category I four criteria specify the structural characteristics of an efficient 
democratic political market and under category II the behavioural characteristics of an 
efficient democratic political market are specified.  
Two questions will be explicitly addressed in the remainder of this article: (1) To what 
extent are the criteria listed in Table 2 met in contemporary Russia? and (2) To what 
extent do the criteria work as a general tool for assessing political markets?  
To answer the first of these two questions the criteria listed in Table 2 will be applied to 
ascertain (a) whether formal rules (officially expressed in legislation) exist through 
which a clear structure of the Russian political market is specified; (b) how these rules 
compare with rules derived from an “ideal-type” definition of democracy; and (c) to 
what extent the behaviour of various actors in the Russian political market complies 
with the rules of the sanctioned institutional set-up and to what extent it is affected by 
corruption. The second question will be addressed in the concluding section.  
Citizens exercising the freedoms and rights that, according to Dahl (1971), democracy 
should guarantee all members of society might, in principle, establish a political system 
characterized by a highly arbitrary conduct of government. By adding the requirement 
that good democracy should sanction the rule of law (which is actually implied by C5 in 
Table 2), the risk for arbitrariness in the conduct of democratic governance is reduced.7 
The adoption of this normative requirement on good democracy puts constitutionalism 
at the centre of interest. “Constitutionalism is the theory that seeks to devise institutions 
which will implement the Rule of Law in the public sector” (Lane & Ersson, 2000:287).  
In the sequel, the suggested approach to the assessment of the efficiency of the Russian 
political market is illustrated by focusing on the constitutionalization process and its 
effects on the structure of the Russian political market. The issue of agency ― various 
actors’ behaviour in the political market ― is not further pursued in this article, despite 
its importance for a comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of the Russian political 
market. 
3 The Constitutional Embedding of the Russian  
Political Market: Specifying the Structure and  
Empowering the Actors 
In this section the formal aspects of the structure of the Russian political market will be 
focused. Four issues are discussed. First, we have a look at how the division of power 
has been implemented in Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. To do so 
we look at the constitutionalization process and identify the most pertinent problems 
with the adopted constitutional provisions. Second, the structure of the electoral system 
                                                 
7 Archie Brown (2001b) bases an assessment of Russian democracy on Dahl’s democracy criteria to 
which he adds two criteria of his own; political accountability and the rule of law. It seems that the latter 
is necessary to limit the potential arbitrariness of democratic governance, while the former can be 
subsumed under the other criteria Dahl suggests (such as the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the 
right of political leaders to compete for support, and free and fair elections). See, for instance, Morlino 
(2004) for a discussion of the quality of democracy.  
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is analysed as it emerges in the institutions regulating popular representation in the 
country’s governance. Third, the territorial structure of governance is discussed as it is 
reflected in the development of Russian federalism, and finally, we review the develop-
ment of some constitutionally sanctioned citizen rights, social resources and public 
procedures that together structure the principal-agent relations between those who 
govern (occupy political office) and those who are governed (citizens, voters) in Russia.  
3.1 Constitutionalism and Semi-Presidentialism 
Arguably the most important issue to take into account in an assessment of the 
efficiency of Russia’s political market is the introduction of Rule of Law. It is therefore 
important to establish to what extent the constitutionalization process has gained ground 
in the Russian society. In this context it is also interesting to look at how the mode of 
governance established in the constitution affects policymaking and the development of 
democracy.  
A country’s constitution is a formal legislative document distinguishing what is to be 
meant by state organs and state competences (powers). The constitution divides various 
competencies, typically the executive, legislative and judicial powers, between various 
state organs, often the head of state, the parliament and the judiciary (Lane & Ersson, 
2000). Existing constitutions are typically of two kinds, “thin” and “thick,” the former 
requiring procedural accountability, representation and division of power, while the 
second, in addition, requires rigid rules for changing the constitution, a bill of rights, 
minority protection, as well as judicial review. Nations observing all rights stipulated in 
their constitution, so-called fully constitutional nations, are characterized by state 
stability and it seems that it is not primarily the constitutional format that matters for the 
longevity of states, but rather the fact that a constitution exists restraining the exercise of 
state power (Lane & Ersson, 2000).  
Leaving aside the dramatic events leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
late 1991 and the subsequent constitutional turmoil ending with the attack on the 
Russian parliament in early October 1993,8 we merely note that, with the adoption in 
December the same year of the new constitution, Russia formally left its undemocratic 
Soviet past behind and seemed to enter a more orderly transition towards modern 
democracy.9  
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Ahdieh (1997) who has analysed the constitutionalization history 1985–1996; 
Sergeyev & Biryukov (1993) who give a contemporary account of early events and the prehistory of the 
constitutional change in Russia; Colton & Skach (2005) who concisely summarize the limited scope for 
action that the situation offered various actors in the turbulence preceding October 1993; and Ellison 
(2006) who recounts in detail the dramatic events of the Yeltsin years. 
9 However, this interpretation of the events can be strongly contested. As many observers have argued 
there is much in the recent political developments in Russia indicating that liberal democracy is rather 
losing ground (cf., for instance, Hahn, 2004; Ross, 2005; Fish, 2005; Stoner-Weiss, 2006b; Holmes, 
2006; and Hanson, 2007). Recent Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties put Russia 
in the “non-free” category of countries (cf., http://www.freedomhouse.org). However, all observers are 
not entirely pessimistic. Sakwa (2005), for instance, analysing the 2003–2004 Russian elections and 
prospects for democracy, finds that recent electoral reforms initiated by President Putin might produce 
more favourable conditions for democracy ― the character of developments will become more clear only 
after the next election cycle (2007/8); see also Moraski (2007).  
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With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the primary task of constitutionalism in 
Russia could be seen as the establishment of basic institutions that should define, 
distribute and constrain state power while simultaneously being conducive to the 
reformation of the country’s economic and political system.  
The mode of governance sanctioned by the 1993 Russian constitution has been labelled 
semi-presidentialist. The system was actually established already in the years preceding 
the constitutional referendum (Huskey, 1996; Colton & Skach, 2005; Skach, 2007). 
Semi-presidentialism combines a popularly elected head of state (president) with a head 
of government (prime minister) responsible to the legislature. Many believed that this 
system combined the best of both presidentialism and parliamentarianism and that it 
would be an ideal constitutional arrangement for countries in transition. The system was 
also adopted by a majority of the transitional countries (Skach, 2007; Sedelius, 2006). 
Observers have noted that while semi-presidentialism might work well enough in 
countries with a consolidated majority government, where both the president and the 
prime minister have the same majority support in the parliament, there are considerable 
problems with this arrangement in countries, like Russia, with a so-called divided 
minority government, i.e., with a parliamentary situation in which neither the president 
nor the prime minister has a majority support (Colton & Skach, 2005). In a semi-
presidential system there are inherent tensions between the president, the prime minister 
and the legislature. In the Russian case such tensions are likely to be especially severe 
due to the unusually strong powers that the 1993 constitution bestows upon the 
president. For instance, the president is empowered in many cases to bypass the 
legislature and rule by decree, he can dissolve the lower house of the parliament (the 
State Duma), he has unrestricted rights to appoint ministers (except prime minister), the 
presidency and his bureaucracy are immune from legislative oversight (Weigle, 2000; 
Willerton, 2005; Colton & Skach, 2005). Actually, formulations in the Russian constitu-
tion defining the president as the head of state can also be seen as “a norm granting the 
president the power to be head of the executive and to decide fundamental political 
issues” (Fogelklou, 2003:189). While Yeltsin refrained from making use of the full 
spectrum of his constitutional powers, president Putin, after his election to the post in 
March 2000, has taken a number of far-reaching measures that together have enhanced 
the powers of the presidential office even further. 
The new constitution provided for subsequent additional federal constitutional 
legislation to enact more specific restrictions on the power invested in various state 
organs. Such legislation has since been introduced and it is still being introduced.10 
Thus, it can be argued that the Russian constitutionalization process still is in a transi-
tional phase (Fogelklou, 2003). Russia is not (yet) a fully constutionalized country, even 
if some of the social benefits of constitutionalization has already been reached, such as a 
degree of state stability. The Russian constitution has also been characterized as 
potentially thick (Fogelklou, 2003), i.e., it includes a bill of rights, it is rigid in the sense 
that the stipulations for changing the constitution are fairly demanding, and it regulates 
the functions of a constitutional court (Art. 125). However, looking more to the actual 
functioning of the constitution, it has to be characterized as thin: “Constitutional values 
do not gain deep ground in society and the president’s accountability is poorly 
                                                 
10 Several examples of this ongoing introduction of new legislation are discussed by various analysts in a 
volume edited by Sharlet & Feldbrugge (2005).  
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developed. The main functions of the constitution are to legitimize and legalize 
decisions but it will not affect the outcomes of the political process very much” 
(Fogelklou, 2003:194).  
Constitutionalization embraces an institutional component, the establishment of con-
stitutional structures. But the process also requires psychological underpinning in the 
form of development of a legal consciousness. Both aspects are of crucial importance 
for the success of the Russian transition. However, a serious problem with the Russian 
transitional reforms has been their emphasis on building constitutional structures while 
neglecting the development of legal consciousness (Ahdieh, 1997, Stoecker, 2003). The 
fact that court rulings in Russia are often not enforced in practice has led to a situation 
where legal norms are frequently disobeyed, with detrimental consequences for legal 
consciousness. This phenomenon is most likely related to the Russian political culture 
that has always allowed political decisions to be taken by members of the elite and the 
elite has basically used the law to further its own interests.11 However, as Ahdieh 
(1997) argues, while constitutionalization initially was a “story of the elite,” arguably, 
there has been a “transformation of mass psychology” in Russia during transition, 
resulting in (or perhaps as a result of) a previously unknown public engagement in the 
political process. This is leading to a transformation of elite-mass relations, where, as 
Ahdieh (1997) claims, the absolute divide between the elite and ordinary citizens is 
beginning to be bridged. These developments implicate a certain learning process 
among Russian citizens, the elite as well as the masses, with potential consequences for 
changes in shared mental models and institutional change.  
A prominent feature of the Russian constitution is the limited scope for action it 
reserves for the legislature. Compared with other post-socialist transition countries 
Russia has a weak parliament with negative consequences for the development of 
political parties and democracy (Fish, 2006). The parliament has hardly any say in the 
appointment of government. But then again, the power and influence of the government 
is also severely restricted by the current constitution, a fact that has made the 
government largely incapable of performing its normal tasks of economic and social 
policymaking (Sokolowski, 2003). The constitution formally specifies the powers of 
control (including, ultimately, the power of dismissal) of the parliament, the government 
and the president, but in practice no one of the three parties can safely exercise this 
power. This tends to lead to frequent stalemates or deadlocks in policymaking (Soko-
lowski, 2003). These are all due to structural features based in the Russian constitution, 
features that impede the efficiency of the Russian political market. During Putin’s 
presidency some of the structural causes of this inefficiency have been eliminated.  
                                                 
11 The Soviet authoritarian political culture entailed a striking disregard for the rule of law (Alexander, 
2000). Instead a whole range of informal institutions sidestepping, as it were, the formal legislation, 
guided the behaviour of most Russians. This “unrule of law” (Gel’man, 2004) survived the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and still exercises a prominent influence on actors’ behaviour in Russia’s economic 
and political markets. The Russian elite, which is largely derived from the old Soviet nomenklatura, is 
content with the current state of affairs that does not interfere with the preservation of its favoured 
position in society. Ordinary citizens have learned to make things work in informal ways and they do not 
expect any sudden improvements in the rule of law. In neither group there is a particularly well-developed 
legal consciousness. In fact, since both groups are favoured by the status quo there seemed to be little 
“demand for law” in Russia in the early 21st century (cf., Hendley, 1999; Pistor, 2002).  
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Thus, in summary, the constitutionalization process in post-soviet Russia, entailing a 
number of constitutional choices (not least semi-presidentialism in its specific form) has 
undoubtedly made a profound but somewhat ambiguous impact on democracy and the 
efficient functioning of the country’s political market (cf., for instance, Ahdieh, 1997; 
Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2005; Colton & Skach, 2005; Sedelius, 2006; Fish, 2006; 
Skach, 2007).  
3.2 Popular Representation 
The manner in which citizens are allowed (and able) to express their political opinion 
and to bring this expression to bear on actual policymaking is perhaps the most 
important feature of democracy and, in our conception, the efficient operation of the 
political market (cf., Fish, 2006). In this context electoral rules are of central 
importance, but also the structure and functioning of the assemblies and offices whose 
officials citizens elect. Thus, for the assessment of these aspects in their Russian context 
it is necessary to look at the rules for electing parliamentary deputies and the president 
as well as the division of power between the legislature and the executive. It is also 
essential to look at the formal rules guiding the establishment and functioning of 
political parties through which citizens’ opinions can be channelled (cf., Lipset, 2000).  
All of Dahl’s (1971) democracy criteria relating to the freedoms and rights of all 
citizens to take part in political life and influence the country’s government (inclusive-
ness and public contestation) were formally sanctioned by the 1993 Russian constitu-
tion.12 While the Russian constitution stipulates that political diversity and a multi-party 
system shall be recognized (Article 13), the specific rules explaining how this multi-
party system should be established and function are laid down in separate legislation.13  
The Russian parliament, the Federal Assembly, consists of an upper house, the Federal 
Council, where the 89 Subjects of the Federation each has two representatives, and a 
lower house, the State Duma, consisting of 450 deputies elected in a two-tier system, 
with one half elected through a majoritarian system and the other half elected by 
proportional federal party lists, with a five percent entry threshold (Hutcheson, 2003). 
                                                 
12 Dahl’s freedoms and rights of citizens are specified in a “bill of rights” spelled out in Chapter 2 of the 
Russian Constitution (the “freedom to form and join organizations” is sanctioned in Articles 13, 30, and 
31; the “freedom of expression” in Article 29; the “right to vote” and the “eligibility for public office” 
and the “right of political leaders to compete for support” in Article 32; “free and fair elections” in Article 
3). The regulation of “institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions 
of preferences” are expressed in Article 10 and 11 of the Constitution, establishing the division of state 
powers into a legislative, an executive, and a judicial power that should be exercised by, respectively, the 
Federal Assembly, the President and the Government, and the courts of the Russian Federation. Further 
regulation concerning this division of power is given in Chapter 3 on the federal structure, in Chapter 4 on 
the President, in Chapter 5 on the Federal Assembly, in Chapter 6 on the Government, and in Chapter 7 
on the judicial system. In addition, the Constitution establishes citizens’ right to private property (incl. 
land) and a free use of their abilities and property for lawful entrepreneurial and economic activities 
(Article 35, 36, and 34, respectively). 
13 In 1995, the law “On Public Associations” (Law No. 82-F3) was adopted to govern the operation of 
political parties. After Putin was elected president, this law was replaced in July 2001 by the law “On 
Political Parties” (Law No. 95-F3) supplemented, in June 2002, by the law “On Fundamental Guarantees 
of Electoral Rights” (Law No. 67-F3) and some other minor changes to the State Duma and presidential 
election laws (Hutcheson, 2003). In December 2004, further amendments were made to the Law on 
Parties.  
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There was no connection between these two modes of election to the State Duma, 
which, in effect, resulted in two separate election campaigns (Huscheson, 2003). While 
this arrangement was originally created with a view to stimulate the emergence of a 
strong party system, in reality it turned out to hamper this goal, instead establishing a 
system beset with a number of principal problems (Ishiyama, 2000; Hutcheson, 2003; 
Thames, 2005). One of the most pervasive problems was that the system generated a 
plethora of parties, mostly small, short-lived, and with a limited territorial penetration, 
basically with presence only at the federal level (Stoner-Weiss, 2001; Golosov, 2003a, 
b; Riggs & Schraeder, 2004; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006). Another consequence was the 
fact that the system allowed ample scope for candidates running in single-member 
district races to win seats in the Duma without the support of a party. Instead the system 
favoured candidates running as so-called “independents,” whose success often hinged 
on the support of party substitutes, e.g., in the form of local elites (regional executives 
and/or business circles) ― a practice that has been labelled “machine politics,” the 
operation of which has hampered the development of political parties in Russia (Moser, 
1999; Hale, 2003; 2005; 2006; Golosov, 2002; Orttung, 2004; Riggs & Schraeder, 
2004; McFaul, 2005; Gel’man, 2006; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006).  
The party system was also dysfunctional in the sense that it could not usefully serve as a 
link between society/citizens and the state. Instead the system rather served the self-
interested political elite (Riggs & Schraeder, 2004; Turovskii, 2006). The Russian party 
system is highly fluid and unstable. Political parties come and go or reshape/rename 
between electoral rounds, they are underinstitutionalized, and they have weak organiza-
tions and underdeveloped internal routines (Rose, 2000; Stoner-Weiss, 2001; 2006a; 
Riggs & Schraeder, 2004; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006). As a result accountability 
suffers.14 Parties are actually formed by members of the elite to serve as their basis for 
gaining access to the Duma in order to have a chance later to become candidates for the 
presidency. Rather than being an answer to citizens’ demand for specific political 
agendas, parties in Russia are established to support the interests of their leaders and 
Duma candidates this way establishing what has been labelled a “supply-side demo-
cracy” (Rose, 2000; Riggs & Schraeder, 2004).  
A characteristic feature of Russian party politics has been the special significance of 
certain parties, so-called “parties of power,” enjoying the support of the Kremlin (cf., 
for instance, Smyth, 2002; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006; Knox, Lentini & Williams, 
                                                 
14 It seems that public accountability has also come to suffer from the rules allowing elected deputies 
(those representing a political party as well as “independents”) to join so-called factions in the Duma. As 
Riggs & Schraeder (2004) observe: “Access to committee and other leadership assignments is granted to 
factions formed after elections, rather than to the electoral parties themselves, with no requirement that 
factions must be representative of electoral results in some fashion. It is only after the election that 
winning candidates show their true colors; independents reveal their political alignments, party candidates 
allied with one party simply for electoral advantage bolt to join a different faction; and others are seduced 
away by opportunities to satisfy their personal ambitions. After each election, the composition of the 
Duma’s ‘party’ system has been strikingly different from what the voters chose and continues to change 
throughout the period between elections. In effect, this erects a barrier that prevents the electorate from 
judging who is accountable for the work of the legislature and thus insulates legislators from the demands 
of the electorate.” See also Weigle (2000) and Smith & Remington (2001) for a more in-depth discussion 
of the role of factions in the Duma and the possibility of factions having a positive influence on 
accountability.  
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2006; Gel’man, 2006; Hale, 2006).15 Being an emergent feature of “supply-side 
democracy,” parties of power represent the interest of the authorities, not the citizenry. 
Efforts to create parties of power can be traced through the entire Russian transition 
period, but success was limited and temporary until Putin was appointed president in 
2001.16 At the regional level governors and regional elites tended to stay out of national 
politics, which might threaten their privileged power position should country-wide 
political parties become entrenched in the regions and in the process enforce increased 
accountability (cf., Stoner-Weiss, 2001; Knox, Lentini & Williams, 2006). However, in 
the campaigns before the 1999 Duma election, regional leaders started creating their 
own political parties. “Unity” was one of the parties established late in this campaign, 
but largely due to support by the prime minister at the time, Vladimir Putin, it gained 
popularity and emerged as one of the winners in the 1999 Duma election. By 
subsequently (in December 2001) merging with Fatherland-All Russia, Unity became 
the still successful United Russia, “a pro-Kremlin party designed to consolidate Putin’s 
control over the Duma” (Knox, Lentini & Williams, 2006:7).  
Thus, as Hutcheson (2003:30) concisely states, “the electoral system has had significant 
effects on the development of parties in Russia.” When taking up his new position, 
President Putin stated that one of his most important tasks would be to reform the party 
system (Hutcheson, 2003). With the new Law on Parties (adopted in July 2001) 
requirements on political parties in Russia became much more demanding. So, for 
example, parties now had to be all-Russian (interregional and regional parties were no 
longer allowed), parties also had to have larger membership numbers and a much 
greater territorial penetration (at least 10,000 members and branches of 100 or more 
members in at least half the 89 federation subjects). The law also bestowed large 
supervisory powers on the “registration body” (Hutcheson, 2003). In a subsequent 
amendment to the law (adopted in December 2004) several of these requirements were 
made even more demanding (Rabinovich, 2007). Hereafter parties are required to have 
at least 50,000 members or more than 500 members in at least 44 regions of Russia. 
Furthermore, with these amendments a strictly proportional electoral system has been 
introduced. Independents can no longer seek to win seats in the Duma by gaining a 
simple majority of the votes, all deputies must now be elected on the basis of party lists, 
and parties must receive a minimum of seven percent of the votes to gain any seats in 
the Duma.17 The same rules are to apply also in elections to regional legislatures.  
As a consequence of these amendments of the law the number of registered parties in 
Russia has been significantly reduced. In April 2007, there were seventeen parties 
                                                 
15 Oversloot & Verheul (2006) distinguish seven different types of parties in Russia, but see the parties of 
power as “the most interesting, and quitessential, element of Russia’s party system ― and political 
system as a whole…” (p. 393). 
16 Concise overviews of the history of the Russian parties of power are given by, for instance, Knox, 
Lentini & Williams (2006) and Oversloot & Verheul (2006). Gel’man (2006) outlines a theory of the 
emergence of parties of power in the Russian political market. 
17 The president also introduced other structural changes in the Russian political market, such as the 
decision to appoint regional leaders (governors) by presidential nomination rather than through popular 
elections and the establishment of the Public Chamber (Obshchestvennaya palata) as an instrument for 
improved dialogue between the civil society and political authorities ― some have resembled it to a 
“third chamber” of the parliament with a supervisory function, a “chamber” to which deputies and 
bureaucrats are not eligible (cf., Oversloot & Verheul, 2006). The chamber and its work is presented on 
the official website at http://www.oprf.ru/.  
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officially registered (Stykow, 2007). Only a few of these parties are expected to actually 
compete for seats in the upcoming (December 2007) federal Duma elections and merely 
four or five parties are expected to reach the seven percent of the votes necessary for 
obtaining seats in the parliament.18  
Observers of the Russian political scene are concerned that the system, as it has 
developed during Putin’s second term in office with United Russia as its dominant party 
of power, relying on “imposed consensus” among the Russian elite, does not allow 
sufficient scope for other parties to channel a real opposition to the sitting government 
and president (Gel’man, 2005; 2007; Wilson, A., 2007). In what has been interpreted as 
a Kremlin orchestrated move, three Russian parties (Rodina, the Party of Life, and the 
Party of Pensioners) were merged in October 2006 forming a “leftist” loyal opposition 
under the name of “Just Russia” (Spravedlivaia Rossiia).  
Besides voting in local, regional, and federal level legislature elections Russian citizens 
are likely to see it as equally, or even more, important to vote in the presidential 
elections. Moreover, being popularly elected to the post is probably the single most 
important factor bestowing legitimacy on the Russian presidency. The president is 
elected by direct majority vote, with a run-off election between two candidates should 
not the first election round give the winner an absolute majority of the votes. The 
presidential elections take place three months after the elections to the Federal Duma. 
These are the fundamental institutions guiding the election of the Russian president. 
Both institutions have been criticized for the restrictions they entail for democracy. 
Simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, it has been argued, would 
stimulate the establishment of an efficient party system, and the second-round run-off 
presidential elections tend to encourage uncompetitive parties and candidates to 
manipulative bargaining for favours ― e.g., cabinet posts in exchange for support (cf., 
Ordeshook, 1995). The rules governing presidential elections may be clear enough, but 
combined with the currently dominating “supply-side democracy” they are open to 
profound manipulation (Rose, 2000; Willerton, 2005; Ellisson, 2006:138 ff.).  
Hence, while citizens’ rights to influence the workings of the Russian political market is 
formally secured through constitutional and legal stipulations concerning the electoral 
system, the significance of these institutions are partly offset by the constitutional rules 
regulating the division of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial state 
organs, rules that give the executive (especially the presidency) the greatest real power 
to influence policymaking (cf., Section 3.1).  
3.3 Territorial Division of Power, Federalism 
Many features of importance for the functioning of a democratic political market have 
to do with the basis of Russia’s federal organization. Being a huge and incongruent 
country with large variations in climatic and economic conditions, Russia is typically 
                                                 
18 The results of the elections to regional legislatures held in March 2007 indicate that at most four (or 
possibly five) parties will gain seats in the Duma through the upcoming December elections. Apart from 
the current party of power United Russia (ER), the following parties are believed to stand the best 
chances of reaching the parliament: the Russian communist party (KPRF), Zhirinovsky’s nationalist party 
(LDPR), the newly formed Kremlin sanctioned loyal opposition party Just Russia (SR), and, possibly, the 
right-wing Union of Right Forces (SPS) (see, for instance, Itogi, 2007; Stanovaia, 2007).  
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suited for a federal organisation (Kahn, 2002). In fact, the size and diversity of Russia 
(with its 170 million square kilometres, 145 million inhabitants, and 172 nationalities 
divided between 89 constituent units, so-called subjects of the federation) makes it, 
according to Ross (2005), “one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multinational 
federations in the world.” Such large differences ― or asymmetries ― contained in a 
single state formation constitute an inherently complex problem for democratic 
governance. The federalist institutional set-up is expected to structure citizens’ 
behaviour so that often highly diverse local, regional and federal interests are reconciled 
while simultaneously allowing an efficient, fair and sustainable exploitation of 
resources. In principle, this task requires highly developed and well-functioning 
democratic institutions. Thus, the prerequisites for successfully establishing federalism 
in Russia were far from favourable.  
Russia “inherited” a federal order ― in name if not in substance ― from the Soviet 
Union.19 Gorbachev’s perestroika encouraged regional elites to act more on their own 
accord to solve regional problems. This de facto ended the Communist Party’s 
hegemonic role in Russian history (Brown, 2001c; Fish, 1995; Stoner-Weiss, 2006b). 
Regional party bosses started to build their power base at the regional level. In many 
cases these party functionaries were subsequently appointed governors in their regions 
and soon became sovereign rulers of their own fiefdoms (Blakkisrud, 2003; Nicholson, 
2003).20 In his power struggle with Gorbachev, Yeltsin appealed to Russia’s regions 
and encouraged their strive for self-government and independence.21 This was the start 
of a period ending not until 1998, during which regional governors had more or less 
unchecked powers, even including the power to influence federal employees working in 
their regions (Orttung, 2001), a development that resulted in a weak federal state power, 
with due problems for introducing and implementing reforms, economic as well as 
political. The development resulted despite the fact that Yeltsin, after being elected 
president, worked hard to restrain the power of the regions and to re-establish federal 
authority on the basis of the new constitution of 1993. Already through the 1992 
Federation Treaty, Yeltsin managed to moderate the “centrifugal forces,” ending up 
with a system mostly resembling a confederation (Alexander, 2004). To keep the 
federation intact Yeltsin had to return some of the power that had been reined in through 
the constitution. This he did by signing bilateral agreements with more than half of the 
Russian regions. Sometimes clauses in these treaties even violated the constitution 
(Huskey, 1999; Alexander, 2004; Ross, 2005; Stoner-Weiss, 2006a).  
The federal system that emerged in Russia during the 1990s could be characterized as a 
loose “asymmetrical federalism” that was weakly institutionalized and included various 
autonomy and consociational mechanisms (Hahn, 2005). When Yeltsin turned the 
presidency over to Putin, it soon was clear that Putin aimed at attacking a number of the 
causes he saw of the weakness characterizing the Russian state at the turn of the 
                                                 
19 Ross (2005) calls Soviet federalism “a sham” and notes that Gorbachev in 1989 admitted that Russians 
had not yet experienced living in a federation, that the Soviet Union was, in fact, a centralized and unitary 
state.  
20 White & McAllister (1996) report that “In the Russian presidential administration, by 1994, fully 75 
per cent were former members of the communist ruling group; 74.3 per cent of the Russian government, 
and as many as 82.3 per cent of the local elite, were from the same origin”. 
21 Yeltsin’s famous advice to Russia’s regions to grab as much sovereignty as they could swallow should 
be seen in this context (see, e.g., Huskey, 1999). 
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millennium, a weakness that threatened a further development towards an efficient 
market economy and democracy in the country. Some of the measures taken by Putin 
with the aim of establishing a “dictatorship of law” have made observers fear that the 
president’s ultimate goal is to de-federalize Russia and convert it into a unitary state 
(cf., Ross, 2005; Hahn, 2005; Konitzer & Wegren, 2006), while others have seen the 
federal reforms of the early 2000s as a shift in “federalist paradigms” due to an 
“ideational change” (Rodin, 2006) that could be seen as a result of a political discourse 
reflecting learning among the actors in the Russian political market.  
A number of centrally initiated and interdependent reforms with impact on federal 
relations have been introduced during Putin’s presidency. Perhaps the most spectacular 
of the measures taken was the establishment (through presidential decrees issued in May 
2000) of seven so-called federal districts headed by presidential envoys (Alexander, 
2004; Ross, 2005; Chebankova, 2005).22 The envoys have strong formal powers. Apart 
from the duties to monitor regions’ compliance with the constitution, federal legislation 
and presidential decrees, and supervise the selection of personnel to regional offices of 
the federal bureaucracy, their task was also to restore the pre-eminence of federal law, 
something which made them central in a huge effort to bring regional legislation into 
conformity with federal law and the constitution (Ross, 2005; Chebankova, 2005; 
Petrov & Slider, 2007). They were also instrumental in overseeing the bilateral treaties 
between the federation and individual regions. Largely through their efforts, 28 of the 
existing 46 bilateral treaties had been annulled by April 2002, and by the summer of 
2004 only eight such treaties were still operative (Ross, 2005). It should be noted that 
bilateral treaties are constitutionally sanctioned (Art. 11). However, according to a law, 
adopted in 2003, any future power-sharing treaties would have to be approved by both 
houses of parliament (Hahn, 2005).  
Putin has also enforced several other reforms affecting federal-regional relations. For 
instance, changes in the election of deputies to the upper house of the parliament were 
introduced. Regional governors and heads of the regional legislative used to be 
members of the Federal Council, but after changes in the law (adopted in July 2000, and 
in effect as of January 1, 2002), these delegates should be appointed by the regional 
assemblies and chief executives (the appointment of the latter subject to approval by the 
regional assemblies). In September 2000, Putin decreed the establishment of a so-called 
State Council, an advisory body meeting once every three months. Members are all 
regional executives. Observers doubt that the council will have much real power; its 
main purpose seems to be to give regional leaders a direct channel to the president 
(Ross, 2005). However, while these reforms formally mean a sharp change compared 
with the previous order, observers tend to believe that their practical effects will not be 
all that dramatic (cf., Alexander, 2004; Ross, 2005).  
In July 2000, Putin also enforced amendments to the law stipulating general 
organizational principles of regional legislative (representative) and executive state 
organs giving the president the right to dismiss popularly elected governors and to 
dissolve regional legislatures (subject to approval by the State Duma). However, the 
requirements for doing so were very demanding (violations of the constitution) and it 
seems that in practice this reform has not been used by the president to dismiss regional 
                                                 
22 A detailed review of the federal district reform and its implementation in the seven districts is given in 
Reddaway & Orttung (2004).  
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executives, much less dissolve any regional legislature (Ross, 2005). But since this law 
also demanded that regional legislation in violation of federal laws or the constitution 
must be brought into accord with federal norms it seems to have been of help for 
prosecutors in their work to challenge regional unconstitutional legislation (Hahn, 
2005).  
After the Beslan hostage tragedy (in September 2004), Putin started a second round of 
federal reforms. Actually, the reforms were planned well before September, but Putin 
used the momentum given him by the tragedy to move forward with the declared pur-
pose of strengthening internal security (Ross, 2005). On October 29, the Duma adopted 
Putin’s proposal to abolish direct elections of regional governors. According to the new 
law it is the task of the regional legislature to approve of the president’s nominees for 
the post. Failing (twice) to do so gives the president the right to dissolve the legislative 
assembly and appoint an acting governor until a new assembly has been elected. As 
some observers have noted (cf., Fish, 2005; Stoner-Weiss, 2006b; Shevtsova, 2006; 
Carothers, 2007; Colton, 2007), these reforms seem to be moving Russia in an increas-
ingly authoritarian direction. Others (see for instance Willerton, Beznosov & Carrier, 
2005), have argued that Western analysts have exaggerated the negative effects of the 
reforms, contending that the reforms have only had “a moderate impact on centre-
periphery relations.” 
Several other reforms with implications for federal-regional relations have also been 
discussed or enacted.23  
The previously noted changes in rules guiding party formation and electoral order also 
have an impact on federal politics. The requirement that all deputies to the State Duma 
be elected from party lists under proportional representation with an electoral threshold 
of seven percent and the raised party membership demands aims at reducing the number 
of parties in the parliament. These reforms, some observers fear (see, e.g., Ross, 2005; 
Chebankova, 2007), will strengthen the Kremlin’s grip on parliamentary politics, at both 
regional and federal level. 
Finally, Hahn (2005) notes that a consociational mechanism in operation during 
Yeltsin’s presidency ― a mechanism mandating a “conciliation procedure” in case a 
federal legislative bill met with protests from the legislative or executive branch in more 
than 30 of the 89 regions ― has been de facto eliminated by Putin. Due to a ruling by 
                                                 
23 For instance, in late 2001 and early 2003, rules were established concerning the merger of federation 
subjects (Ross, 2005; Hahn, 2005). The benefits of such mergers have long been discussed, goals of 
reducing the total number of subjects from the present 89 to 45 have been mentioned, even if such a 
dramatic reduction has been considered unrealistic. So far, the reforms have led to mergers of some 
autonomous oblasts with the regions in which territory they are located, thus contributing to eliminating 
what Hahn (2005) has called administrative-structural asymmetry. The development has been of great 
concern for Russia’s twenty-one ethnic republics and eleven autonomous okrugs, where it is feared that 
eventually all ethnic regions will be swallowed up by the territorially defined regions (Cashaback, 2003; 
Ross, 2005). Inter-budgetary relations have also played a significant role for the practical implementation 
of Russian federalism (cf., for instance, Alexander, 2004; Hahn, 2005). Under Yeltsin, tax revenues were 
roughly divided 50–50 between the federation and the regions, but there were huge differences in agreed 
upon exemptions (stipulated in the bilateral treaties) leading to a situation where some regions could keep 
and others had to contribute much more than the established 50 percent share. The fiscal federal relations 
will be affected by a local self-administration reform approved in 2003 to be gradually implemented from 
2006 (cf., Lankina, 2005). But the distribution of tax revenues between the federal, regional and local 
level is still very much the topic of ongoing debates (Hahn, 2005). 
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the Constitutional Court in connection with the adoption of the new Land Code in 2004 
no conciliation with the regional authorities had to take place despite protests from both 
the legislative and the executive branch in 35 regions. Thus, it seems that “the federal 
parliament can now exclude regional legislatures from the federal law-making process 
and pass bills without taking into account opinion in the regions” (Hahn, 2005:164).  
3.4 Guaranteed Citizens’ Rights, Social Resources and  
Public Procedures 
Among the guarantees and freedoms that Dahl (1971) considers essential for a 
democratic regime (cf., section 2.3) are free and fair elections, freedom to form and join 
organizations, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information. All of 
these features are instituted and specified in various articles of the Russian 1993 
constitution.24  
3.4.1 Free Elections 
As Michael McFaul (2005:61) notes: “Competitive elections are the most dramatic 
institutional change that distinguishes the old Soviet dictatorship from the new Russian 
political system.” So far, in the period since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
popular elections to the Russian parliament have been held four times (1993, 1995, 
1999, 2003) with a fifth election coming up in December 2007. There have also been 
four presidential elections (1991, 1996, 2000, 2004) with a fifth election scheduled for 
March 2008. The rules governing elections have been stable throughout the period since 
1993. Elections have also been competitive in the sense that there was a choice to be 
made by the voters between different parties and candidates. But the conditions for 
candidates and parties standing for election have been highly varying, mostly depending 
upon the rules for financial support of election contestants and the fact that media 
freedom in Russia has decreased, especially during Putin’s presidency (cf., for instance, 
Gel’man, 2001; Hale, 2003; McFaul, 2005; Ledeneva, 2006).25 Thus, the electoral 
playing field has become increasingly uneven.  
Obviously, the manner in which political parties and individual politicians fund their 
operations is of importance for their ability to compete in the electoral arena. This is 
nothing specific for Russia. Rules for funding political parties are typically specified in 
the legislation of most democratic countries, transparency guaranteed through public 
audit. Such rules are also found in the Russian law on parties. Here requisites are 
                                                 
24 In Article 3:3 of the Russian Constitution it is stated that the supreme direct expression of power of the 
people shall be referenda and free elections. Article 81:1 rules that the President shall be elected for four 
years by citizens of the RF on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage by secret ballot (more specific 
rules of presidential elections should, however ― according to Section 4 of the same Article ― be 
determined by federal law). Article 96 provides the corresponding rulings for elections to the State Duma. 
Article 13:4 states that public associations shall be equal before the law; Article 31 stipulates that citizens 
have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, 
marches and pickets. Article 29:1 ensures that everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of ideas and 
speech, according to Section 4 of the same article everyone shall have the right to freely look for, receive, 
transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way, and, according to Section 5, the freedom 
of mass communication shall be guaranteed and censorship shall be banned.  
25 The situation of the media in Russia is further discussed in the next section. 
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specified for parties to obtain state financial support (Oversloot & Verheul, 2006).26 
Parties can also muster financial support through membership dues or subsidies from 
individual citizens and enterprises. While the level of membership dues is not regulated 
by law, maximal levels are specified for donations (Ikstens, Smilov & Walecki, 2002:59 
ff.; Wilson, K., 2007). As reported by Kenneth Wilson (2007), recently published data 
show that parties were very heavily dependent upon private donations for funding their 
activities, the overwhelming part of which coming from large corporations. 
Furthermore, as some observers claim (cf., for instance, Gel’man, 2001; Wilson, K., 
2007), the greater part of the funds used for political campaigning are “unofficial” ― 
the official (visible) part may be likened to the tip of an iceberg.27 Large capital 
interests, in the form of financial-industrial groups (FIGs) typically controlled by 
oligarchs, contribute funds and can often provide parties access to media (Hadenius, 
2002; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006). Thus, money transactions in this arena are far from 
transparent.28 And, still, perhaps the most significant resource bias in the system does 
not primarily have to do with direct money payments. Observers have noted the 
immense advantage that incumbents have in the Russian political system (cf., for 
instance, McFaul, 2005; Hale, 2003) through their control over so-called “adminis-
trative resources.” The party in power, the sitting president or, at the regional level, 
republican presidents and oblast governors, can freely use the bureaucratic apparatus to 
serve their own interests and gain advantage in electoral campaigns. Such “machine 
politics” has been prominent, especially at the regional level (Hadenius, 2002; Hale, 
2003; 2005; 2006; Ledeneva, 2006; Oversloot & Verheul, 2006; Wilson, A., 2005).  
These are all structural factors that have allowed political parties to be captured by the 
state rather than vice versa, which is normal procedure in democracies, where represen-
tatives of political parties occupy positions in the state in relation to electoral success 
(Oversloot & Verheul, 2006).29 Another consequence is that political parties have been 
supplied by the Russian elite, rather than being formed in response to citizens’ demand 
(Rose, 2000). The same factors have also limited the reach of political parties ― 
political parties on the federal level have had difficulties to become established in the 
regions (cf., Stoner-Weiss, 2001; 2006a) ― and it has favoured candidates running in 
single member districts, whether they have been members of political parties or so-
called independents. However, with the recently introduced modifications in the 
electoral rules (e.g., the requirement that all candidates be elected via party lists, cf., 
                                                 
26 According to the law, parties obtaining at least three percent of the list vote in Duma elections, or who 
get at least 12 single-member district candidates elected, or who collect at least three percent of the votes 
for their presidential nominee receive state funding.  
27 Gel’man (2001:179–180) illustrates his discussion with a story of how Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996 was 
supported by “extra-legal (though not always illegal) payments of cash of, to put it mildly, either doubtful 
origin, or so-called ‘black cash’ (chernyi nal).”  
28 As Oversloot & Verheul (2006) point out, business support of political parties only rarely lead to 
lawsuits. The prosecution of oligarch Khodorkovsky should probably be seen as an exception. 
Khodorkovsky sponsored several different political parties (SPS and the CPFR) seemingly with political 
ambitions of his own.  
29 In fact, the emergence of “parties of power” in Russian politics (cf., for instance, Smyth, 2002; Knox et 
al., 2006), and Putin’s recently “invented opposition” (the Just Russia party) are indications of the state 
capturing party politics (Sestanovich, 2007). In his recent analysis of party funding, Wilson (2007:1098) 
maintains that parties are also to some extent captured by large corporations that actually “buy” (through 
donations) places on party lists “with a view to securing direct influence in the state legislature.” 
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above), the structural prerequisites for Russian political life have changed with 
potentially significant behavioural effects.  
3.4.2 Mass Media  
Freedom of speech and of expressing opinions is central for the development and 
functioning of democracy (Dahl, 1971; Sen, 1999; Morlino, 2004). As already noted, 
the 1993 Russian constitution guarantees these freedoms. However, to serve the 
development of democracy there must also exist public media of various forms, through 
which citizens can inform, and be informed, about important events in society and 
existing differences of opinion (political as well as non-political). This is absolutely 
essential for citizens’ ability to assess their situation and arrive at well-founded opinions 
that can guide their political behaviour, their participation in democratic governance.  
The media situation in Russia today is of course radically different from that of Soviet 
times, when media and journalists mainly served the interests of the state and, 
ultimately, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the sole “party of power” 
in those times. Through media the authorities could efficiently distribute such 
information that they considered important for citizens to know. For example, in 1980, 
the two largest Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, had a circulation of, respec-
tively, close to 11 and 7 million, volumes that gave them a leading position in the world 
(Oates, 2005). In 1990, right before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, more than 
8,400 newspapers, magazines and periodicals were published. Television also grew fast 
in the Soviet Union, from reaching merely five percent of the population in 1970 to 
about 99 percent in 1990 (Oates, 2005).30  
With Gorbachev and glasnost’ the media situation started rapidly to change in the latter 
half of the 1980s (Lipman & McFaul, 2001). New topics were now covered by the 
media, topics that had not been allowed earlier. The authorities soon lost control over 
what was transmitted through the media. In connection with the August 1991 coup 
attempt against Gorbachev, media played a very active role in support of continued 
reforms defying a return to old Soviet authoritarian rule (Oates, 2005).  
The legal underpinning of Russian media is still the Law on the Mass Media (N 2124-I) 
adopted already in December 1991. This law is, in the words of Richter (2005), “one of 
Russia’s most liberal laws and one of the world’s most advanced laws regulating the 
field.” The opportunities given by this law and the dramatic political changes taking 
place in the period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union prompted a reformation 
and revitalization of the media in answer to citizens’ demands for uncensored 
information and initiated discussion. However, the chaotic first years of transition, with 
its dramatic economic regression and lack of business rules adapted to the needs of 
media in an emerging market economy, had severe consequences for the media world in 
terms of reduced circulation, and close-down of many newspapers and magazines. 
While trying to attract funding from business through advertising, most newspapers and 
magazines were still dependent upon government subsidies in one form or another. As 
Sara Oates (2005:121) explains:  
                                                 
30 As Oates (2005:117) points out: “This was a remarkable technological achievement in a country as vast 
as Russia, in which 13 per cent of homes still lacked running water and 60 per cent had no telephone lines 
by the 1990s (according to official statistics).” 
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Those [publications] that did survive had to deal with twin pressures from funding sources 
in the government and the demands of their advertisers. Even if advertisers have no direct 
interest in editorial content, they do demand popular content, a desire that can run counter 
to the government’s need to inform or even propagandize the viewers and readers. In this 
sense, the Russian media have the worst of both worlds, beholden to both government and 
commercial sponsors.  
In such a market structure, in which media enterprises faced a very demanding financial 
situation, but where at the same time a tremendous business potential existed, it is 
hardly surprising that the media sector soon was invaded by the emerging “oligarchial 
capital” (Belin, 2001). The primary goal of this invasion was television, which had 
successively taken the lead over both radio and printed media in the competition for 
Russian media consumers. For most of the seven year period after 1993, oligarchs 
Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky dominated the media scene in Russia through 
their ownership of national television networks and several national newspapers.31 
According to observers of Russian media (e.g., Oates, 2005), the outlets owned by the 
two tycoons published a varied and often critical commentary of current events, such as 
the first Chechen war (1994–1996). This relative media freedom was possible mainly 
because President Yeltsin, even if he thought media reports and judgements incorrect or 
unfair, remained a supporter of a free press (Becker, 2004). But Yeltsin also allowed 
business tycoons to become closer engaged in government, and there are ample reports 
of how his re-election to the presidency in 1996 (when there was a real threat that he 
would lose the position to Communist Party leader Zyuganov) was helped by the 
business controlled media turning around an unfavourable public opinion (Coalson, 
2000; Belin, 2001; Hoffman, 2002; Oates, 2005).32 A similar, and perhaps even more 
biased media coverage, now primarily staged by state television, in favour of 
incumbents, also influenced the outcomes of the 1999 parliamentary and the 2000 
presidential elections (Belin, 2001; White, McAllister & Oates, 2002; White & Oates, 
2003; Becker, 2004; Hale, 2004). Studies of the press and electoral behaviour has also 
shown that television indeed had a strong or even decisive influence on citizens’ voting 
behaviour (cf., for instance, Colton, 2000; White, McAllister & Oates, 2002). All the 
more worrying then that unusually dirty methods were widely used in media coverage 
of opposition parties and candidates. Misinformation, or so-called kompromat, created 
by “election technologists” was a common (and seemingly popular!) feature in tele-
vision (Belin, 2001; White & Oates, 2003; Oates, 2005).33  
In the period since 2000, during Putin’s presidency and, according to several assess-
ments, largely orchestrated by him, the ownership structure of the Russian media has 
changed significantly, mainly due to the “expulsion” of the media tycoons Gusinsky and 
Berezovsky on what seems to be administration managed charges of financial fraud 
                                                 
31 “Gusinsky, head of the banking concern Media-Most, founded the NTV television channel in 1993. 
[…] The Media-Most group also controlled the influential Segodnya (Today) newspaper, the weekly 
news magazine Itogi (Results) and the Echo of Moscow radio station. […] Brerezovsky, a former Soviet 
official turned Russian entrepreneur, owned a substantial share in the First Channel (then called Public 
Russian Television) as well as controlling interests in the commercial TV-6 station and three major 
newspapers” (Oates, 2005:122). 
32 Hoffman (2002, Chapt. 13) gives an especially vivid account of how the oligarchs (Gusinsky and 
Berezovsky) helped Yeltsin win the 1996 presidential election.  
33 See Ledeneva (2006, Chapt. 3) for an analysis of the kompromat phenomenon and its effects on 
political life in Russia. See also Wilson (2005) for a detailed elaboration on the concept of “political 
technology.” 
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(Belin, 2001; Lipman & McFaul, 2001; Oates, 2005). Both oligarchs were subsequently 
forced to sell their shares in their television and print-media networks and both eventu-
ally left Russia in order to avoid legal prosecution (Orttung, 2006). While still at this 
time observers of the Russian media found some grounds for optimism concerning 
media’s independence from state control (cf., for instance, Belin, 2001; Lipman & 
McFaul, 2001) the situation has since then continuously deteriorated. As a consequence, 
media coverage of the 2003 parliamentary and the 2004 presidential elections was 
basically under Kremlin’s control (McFaul, 2005; Oates, 2005).  
Developments in the Russian media market during the last few years have given several 
causes for concern. As one observer notes (Oates, 2005:128): “It is clear that the main 
aim of most of the media in Russia is not unbiased or even balanced reporting; rather 
they seek to maintain the current elites in power.” Simultaneously, and perhaps 
unexpectedly, surveys indicate that Russian citizens appear to trust their state controlled 
media (White & Oates (2003:33):  
… there is considerable support for the idea that television, as in the Soviet years, should 
support the state and its various objectives. […]  
One of our more unexpected findings was that Russians had a more positive view of their 
media under Putin than during perestroika or in the early postcommunist years. Even more 
strikingly, relatively few thought it was the job of the media in any case to provide a broad 
and objective diet of information. Many thought a free media would be ‘dangerous’, and 
that it was more important for the media to encourage the development of a stable and well 
ordered society. One reason for their confidence in Russian Public Television was that it 
was ‘authoritative’ and ‘patriotic’. 
Despite the prevailing “media climate,” independent journalism still exists in Russia ― 
the small newspaper Novaya Gazeta and various internet sites are often mentioned as 
examples ― that seeks to report on current social, economic and political problems in 
society. However, journalists engaged in such critical scrutiny risk becoming banned 
from publishing, or losing their jobs, even their lives. According to a rating by the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Russia is the third most dangerous country in 
the world for journalists, after Iraq and Algeria.34 Since 1992, CPJ has registered 44 
unnatural deaths among journalists in Russia, 14 of them died after 2000 during Putin’s 
presidency.35 Other international ratings show how Russia’s score for press freedom has 
successively decreased. The Freedom House score for Russia’s media independence 
decreased from 3.75 in 1997 to 6.00 in 2006.36 This could be compared with the 
average score for new EU member countries of 1.94 and 1.88 for the respective years. 
                                                 
34 See statistics on the CPJ website at http://www.cpj.org/killed/killed_archives/stats.html.  
35 The organization “Reporters Without Borders” claims that 21 journalists have been killed since Putin 
became president in March 2000 (Russia ― Annual Report 2007, retrieved on May 29, 2007, from 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20823&Valider=OK).  
36 Ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is the highest score. Among “Non-Baltic Former Soviet 
States” Russia’s media freedom rating for 2006 placed it on a par with Azerbaijan, and before Belarus 
(6.75), Kazakhstan (6.75), Turkmenistan (7.00), and Uzbekistan (7.00). (Data from Table 4 Independent 
Media Ratings History and Regional Breakdown, in Nations in Transit 2006 published by Freedom 
House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/), table retrieved on May 29, 2007, from http://www.freedomhouse 
.org/uploads/Chart96 File115.pdf). 
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In their Press Freedom Index for 2006, the organization Reporters Without Borders 
ranked Russia 147th, North Korea had the lowest rank (168) of all.37  
In such a situation it is hardly surprising that bad journalistic practices, such as self-
censorship and a corrupt culture of “paid-for-journalism” (hidden advertisements), have 
become wide-spread among Russian journalists (Becker, 2004; Oates, 2005; O’Reilly, 
2006). To make the situation for free media and independent journalism even more 
difficult, media owners and journalists are poorly protected by a weak judiciary 
(Becker, 2004).  
Despite the concern evoked by the previous summary of developments in the Russian 
media landscape, it is still essential to remember that the situation today radically differs 
from the situation before perestroika. Although media’s election coverage has been 
biased Becker (2004) finds that the media situation nevertheless has improved “in terms 
of autonomy, control of content, pluralism and ideology/language”.  
3.4.3 Civil Society  
Institutions governing civil society constitute another structural constraint that strongly 
affects actors’ behaviour in the Russian political market. As already noted, the 1993 
Russian constitution guarantees freedom of speech and organization (Articles 29, 30 and 
31). Russian civil society was subsequently regulated through a federal law “On Public 
Associations” adopted in 1995 (Squier, 2002). Until then it had been subject to the Law 
on Associations of 1990, which was inadequate to the task since “structures and 
processes that had regulated group activity were no longer in place” in the early post-
communist Russia (Weigle, 2002).38  
The importance of civil society for the quality and efficient functioning of democratic 
governance has long been argued by political scientists (cf., Putnam, 1993; Diamond, 
2001; Amnå, 2005).39 The meaning of the concept civil society seems notoriously 
difficult to define in a precise way. It refers to organized collective activities at the 
intermediate level between the public and private spheres, between the state and its 
citizens/households ― it is also sometimes called the “third sector” separating it from 
the state, with its execution of coercive power, and business, with its profit motivated 
activity (Evans, 2005; Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom, 2006). Here, we primarily think 
of civil society as civic organizations, engaging citizens in work aiming at producing 
certain goods or services that are not produced, or produced in insufficient quantities, by 
the state or the business sector. Civic organizations might also be engaged in work 
aiming at influencing public opinion with the purpose of prompting political actors 
(including state authorities) to change certain policies. Such civic organizations are also 
commonly known as NGOs ― non-governmental organizations. This conception of 
civil society excludes business firms, media companies, groups employing violence to 
                                                 
37 See current index at http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=639. The only former Soviet 
republics with a lower ranking were Belarus (rank 151), Uzbekistan (rank 158), and Turkmenistan (rank 
167). 
38 See Weigle (2000; 2002) for a detailed account of the emergence of Russian civil society and its legal 
foundations in Russia. 
39 Arguments indicating that, in general, the relationship between popular engagement in civil society 
does not automatically foster democratic values and help promote democracy have also been voiced; see, 
for instance, Theiss-Morse & Hibbing (2005).  
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achieve their goals (e.g., terrorist groups), criminal organizations and other organized 
corrupt activity in society, even if the activity of such social formations impose far-
reaching restrictions on activities in all sectors of society and, thus, significantly shape 
the environment in which civic organizations function.  
Specifying the meaning of civil society in this way has been wisely suggested by Henry 
E. Hale (2002), who thinks that the general object of discussion should not be civil 
society, but rather the issue of how to organise state-society relations. Hale also draws 
attention to an important distinction in our view of state-society relations with 
consequences for how these relations are assessed. He notes that there are (at least) two 
conceptions ― or models ― of state-society relations, the liberal and the statist models, 
the former emerging from the historical development of state-society relations in the 
US, the second closer related to the situation in many European countries. In the US, the 
manner in which state-society relations is organized has always been determined with a 
view to limiting the power of the state (avoid “tyranny”), while in the European 
tradition, the organization of state-society relations aims at preserving the state from too 
much (incoherent and damaging) influence by society (avoid “anarchy”). Arguably, 
analyses of the Russian civil society tend to be biased depending upon which view 
(model) of state-society relations the analyst adopts. Actual developments of state-
society relations in Russia seem to mainly conform to the statist model, while much of 
the critical views about this development has been influenced by the liberal model of 
state-society relations.  
Civic organizations emerged in Russia already during the last decades of the 19th cen-
tury and continued to develop into the first decades of the 20th century (Bradley, 2002; 
Evans, 2005; Conroy, 2006). Religious organizations (in the Russian Orthodox Church) 
performed important charitable work (Evans, 2006a). While the Bolshevik revolution of 
1917 initially stimulated popular activity and artistic creativity, the Soviet state 
(ultimately the CPSU, the Communist Party), as it was gradually entrenched, aimed at 
increasing its control over social organizations (Evans, 2006a). From the mid 1920s, 
voluntary, independent civic organizations were being closed down or converted into 
state controlled organizations, such as the communist youth organization Komsomol 
(Evans, 2005). While, in the 1960s, there appeared numerous “social groups” with a 
basis in scientific institutions, often with a nature preservation agenda, it was not until 
Gorbachev’s perestroika from the mid 1980s that civic initiatives were encouraged and 
many new citizen initiated informal groups independent from the state appeared in 
Russia (Evans, 2006a). At this time Gorbachev also changed the relation of the state to 
the Russian Orthodox Church. Through a new law adopted in September 1990 most 
restrictions on religious activities were removed (ibid.).  
Legal social organizations in the Soviet Union were expected to assist the regime in 
achieving its goals, but they also often tried to help its members and to promote their 
interests. As Evans (2005:100) has observed, this “dualistic functioning of most Soviet 
social organizations is worth noting, because it has affected their activities and the 
prospects for their survival in the postcommunist period.” Evans (2006a) also notes the 
importance in the late Soviet era of the patron-client relations existing between the state 
and social organizations, or rather, between representatives of the state (or the CPSU) 
and representatives of the social organizations ― personal relations that might allow 
social organizations some influence over policymaking, even if this ultimately took 
place on terms decided by the state representative. Similar patron-client relations have 
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long prevailed (and could be expected to still prevail) in post-soviet times, indicating 
that for civic organizations to gain some influence over policymaking it is still 
necessary to have access to the political power, through personal interaction with 
representatives of the executive, a practice that maintains the private nature ― or 
patron-client relations ― of public affairs (cf., Shevtsova, 2006).40 
Despite the lively development of civil society in the Gorbachev years, the 1990s 
witnessed a decline in civic activity. Many reasons for this decline might be envisaged. 
Both material and psychological incentives for joining and working with civic 
organizations dwindled. In the economic recession, especially during the first half of the 
1990s, people had to focus on basic needs leaving little or no time for civic activities 
(Evans, 2002; Domrin, 2003). With the weakening rule of law and the state having been 
captured by business interests, allowing a handful of people, the so-called oligarchs, to 
enrich themselves in a legally dubious manner, the legitimacy of the state and people’s 
trust in public authorities and institutions all but disappeared. In this situation civil 
society was not left with much scope for successful work and influence on 
policymaking (Howard, 2002). Psychologically, due to a general scepticism of politics 
inherited from the time of Soviet one-party rule, citizens were reluctant to engage in 
organized social or political activity, and, even more seriously, due to a kind of 
“postcommunist syndrome” most citizens had come to “share feelings of powerlessness, 
passivity, pessimism, fear of further changes, and nostalgia for a paternalistic state,” 
feelings that discouraged them from engaging in civic activities (Evans, 2002).41  
State control of NGOs working in Russia has increased since Putin took office as 
president in 2000 (cf., for instance, Evans, 2006b). At the same time it should be noted 
that Putin in his speeches has talked very positively about the importance of Russian 
civil society.42 Even if nice words are no evidence of real commitment, the stand taken 
by the president nevertheless is significant since, as Weigle (2002) puts it, “[t]he very 
public recognition of that fact [that civil society is essential for the consolidation of 
democracy] legitimates the goals of civil society in official discourse and offers a 
presidential commitment to steer federal resources toward the institutionalization of 
                                                 
40 Henderson (2002) argues that foreign aid (NGO support) to building civil society in Russia has also 
contributed to the establishment of patron-client ties between donor organizations and the NGOs 
receiving the aid. Rather than building networks of civic engagement of lasting significance in Russia the 
NGOs pursue short term benefits.  
41 Evans (2002), citing several Russian sources, explains that a “new Russian individualism” could be 
seen as an “unintended attitudinal legacy of the Soviet system, which implicitly fostered the growth of 
“privatism” in people’s values in reaction to the often phony collectivism that was imposed by the party-
state regime.” This individualism is described as “a direct continuation of the opportunistic individualism 
of Soviet citizens, expressing the outlook of a person who feels free from the norms of the old socialist 
order and is highly skeptical about the genuineness of other guidelines to conduct, such as those con-
sistent with liberal democracy and civil society.” It is claimed that this “amoral individualism discourages 
most Russian citizens from participating voluntarily in the work of independent social organizations that 
attempt to change society from the bottom up.” 
42 See, for instance, Malgin et al. (2005;18–20) who note that Putin has emphasized the importance of 
Russian civil society for the continued development of democracy and economic prosperity in his yearly 
presidential addresses to the Federation Council. In the 2007 presidential address, Putin (2007) pointed to 
the work of the Public Chamber and underlined that “It is impossible to imagine the democratic political 
process without the participation of non-governmental organsations, without taking into account their 
views and opinions.” In 2007, the government also increased its financial support of public organizations 
by 300 percent (Putin, 2007). 
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civil society activity.” Weigle (2002) also recounts how a “groundwork has slowly been 
established for a civil society in postcommunist Russia,” noting that independent groups 
have “woven a thin but durable web of interaction among themselves and between a 
bounded third sector and local and regional government.” But support has been inade-
quate from officials at the federal level, which has limited the influence of civil society 
on policymaking (Weigle, 2002).  
However, despite the clear commitment in support of civil society and the rather 
positive conditions for third sector activities developed at the regional level, observers 
have pointed to several measures taken at the initiative of President Putin that have 
raised obstacles for a further development of NGO activities in the country. For 
instance, in June 2001, the president initiated the organizing of a Civic Forum to take 
place in November the same year. The original intention seems to have been to create 
some kind of a corporatist umbrella organization to facilitate communication between 
civil society representatives and the federal authorities (Squier, 2002; Nikitin & 
Buchanan, 2002). Due to massive protests from civic organizations the plans were 
changed and the NGOs acquired a stronger say in the design of the event. Through the 
joint efforts of several civil society organizations, the main goal set for the forum was to 
“develop links between civil society activists and the government, not for the 
representatives of NGOs and NCOs to supplant the State Duma as the legitimate 
representative of the citizens of Russia” (Weigle, 2002). This move “undercut any 
attempt on the part of the president to generate populist support or to co-opt third-sector 
groups into a loyal state apparatus” (Weigle, 2002). In the end, about four thousand 
representatives of Russia’s NGOs and NCOs participated in the two-day meeting. Most 
observers seem to agree that the specific outcome of the forum was less interesting 
compared to what it revealed about the strength of Russian civil society. The event 
showed that civil society was capable of resisting co-optation by the state, it displayed 
the ability of many organizations to join forces to reach specific goals, it made state 
officials more aware of the fact that many civic organizations possess competence that 
might be useful for solving pressing economic, social, and political issues and that 
cooperation between state and civil society could help solving such problems (Weigle, 
2002; Squier, 2002; Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002).  
Finally, two recent events affecting the structure within which Russian civil society 
operates should be mentioned: the establishment of the Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation and the amendments to the Law on Public Associations. Both events reached 
their decisive phase in late 2005. 
In September 2004, following the Beslan school hostage tragedy, President Putin 
proposed the establishment of a Public Chamber that was to be an advisory and super-
visory body independent from traditional political institutions like the parliament. The 
proposal was subsequently implemented through a federal law “On the Russian Public 
Chamber,” adopted by the parliament in March and signed by the president in early 
April 2005. Members of the 126 seat Chamber were to be appointed in the year to come, 
one third of the members appointed by the president, and the remaining two thirds 
elected in a two-step procedure from among NGOs all over the country.43 By December 
2005 the selection procedure was finished and on 22 January 2006, the Public Chamber 
                                                 
43 The rather elaborate procedure through which members of the Public Chamber are appointed/selected 
is further described on the Chamber’s website at http://www.oprf.ru/.  
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held its first plenary session. Members’ term in office is two years from the Chamber’s 
first session. Among the members (who cannot be parliamentary deputies) many well-
known figures in Russia can be found, from religious leaders, pop stars and artists to 
lawyers, enterprise leaders, and nuclear scientists.  
According to the law the function of the Public Chamber is to “facilitate coordination 
between the socially significant interests of citizens of Russia, NGOs, and national and 
local authorities, in order to resolve the most important problems of economic and 
social development, to ensure national security, and to defend the rights and freedoms 
of citizens of Russia, the Russian constitutional system, and the democratic principles of 
the development of civil society in Russia…”44  
The Chamber has established eighteen commissions and several working groups (in 
which non-members of the Chamber also participate) to discuss various issues under its 
mandate. One of these commissions deals with the “Development of Civil Society and 
Public Participation in the Implementation of National Projects.” Public Chambers have 
also been established in several Russian regions.45 
The establishment of the Public Chamber was met with scepticism from many civic 
organizations, some fearing that this was only another way of the elite to increase its 
control over Russian citizens, actually as a way for the president to fit civic organiza-
tions into the state “vertical of power,” while other critics saw it as a way for govern-
ment friendly NGOs to obtain benefits for their members (Petrov, 2005; Shevtsova, 
2006; Evans, 2006b).46 Proponents of the Chamber would argue that this was a measure 
taken by the government with the purpose of facilitating communication with civil 
society and thus something that will contribute to remedying one of the long-standing 
problems in the Russian society, where citizens and civic organizations in general have 
been reluctant to directly engage with state authorities (Mekhanik, 2004; Gromov, 
2005).47 
In the autumn of 2005, the State Duma passed a bill with amendments to the 1995 Law 
on Public Associations and three other laws with impact on NGO activity. During the 
parliamentary processing of the bill the proposals caused a lively debate in the media, 
where commentators feared that the amendments would bring NGOs under tight state 
control, requiring, among other things, that some NGOs must reregister with the 
authorities to be allowed continued activity. Speculations had it that these measures 
were proposed by the government in an effort to counter foreign influence on Russian 
politics in order to avoid a development in Russia like that which led to the Orange 
Revolution in the Ukraine (Medetsky, 2005; Rykovtseva, 2005; Yablokova, 2005). The 
bill was criticized by representatives of many civic organizations and some independent 
                                                 
44 See the Chamber’s website at http://www.oprf.ru/eng/about/, where the mission of the chamber is 
spelled out in more detail (link last verified on November 22, 2007).  
45 See http://www.oprf.ru/structure/comissions/ for a listing of the chamber’s commissions and 
http://www.oprf. ru/interaction/region_chambers/ for a listing of exsiting regional public chambers (links 
last verified on November 25, 2007). 
46 Evans (2006b:148 ff.) recounts how Putin in the period leading up to the establishment of the Public 
Chamber in 2005 strived to strengthen the Russian state and how various measures taken as part of his 
“managed democracy” infringed on the activities of civil society, especially NGOs (often with 
international funding) working with human rights monitoring and support. 
47 See also Doklad (2007), the report on the state of Russian civil society issued by the Public Chamber in 
the spring of 2007.  
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deputies in the Duma opposed the bill. Already before it had been fully manned the 
Public Chamber made a statement in December 2005 urging that the passing of the bill 
should be postponed until January to allow the Chamber to study the proposals.48 
During the Chamber’s first plenary meeting on January 22, 2006, both President Putin 
and members of the Chamber mentioned the amendments to the NGO legislation, the 
president urging the Chamber to oversee the implementation of the new law (Medetsky, 
2006). According to Interfax news agency, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour, expressed concern about the implementation of the amended 
laws, especially regarding stipulations on NGO registration and tax accounting.49 The 
amended law required reregistration of foreign non-profit organizations before October 
18, 2006. The deadline was subsequently removed and the slow reregistration procedure 
seems still to be going on in mid November 2007, when, according to a list published 
on the Federal Registration Service website, 237 foreign NGOs had successfully 
registered.50  
4 Discussion and Assessment 
The functioning of a market, be it an economic or a political market, rests upon the 
enactment of certain conditions, such as actors’ free entry and exit, their equal 
opportunity to compete (i.e., not being discriminated against by public authorities, or 
other market actors), their having equal access to information, their adherence to rules 
guiding proper market behaviour, avoiding to cause market imperfections (e.g., through 
monopolizing certain behaviours), and their strive to minimize negative external effects. 
As was recounted above, the rules (institutions) contained in the 1993 constitution 
guarantee Russian citizens a number of rights and freedoms that together define the 
structure of Russian democracy, thus establishing a playing field for citizens’ political 
behaviour. One question of concern here is whether or not this playing field has become 
increasingly even so that it offers equal opportunities for different players, an improved 
or more advanced democracy. Another question is whether the playing field has 
developed in a way that allows a better game, a more efficient interaction in the political 
market.  
Here we first summarize the most important structural changes affecting the Russian 
political system that were introduced over the last few years and assess their impact on 
                                                 
48 As reported by several news agencies, see e.g., Interfax “Russia’s Public Chamber urges Duma to put 
off NGO bill,” December 18, 2005; RIA Novosti “Public Chamber points out minuses in NGO bill,” 
December 23, 2005.  
49 Interfax “UN Rights Commissioner Still Concerned at Russia’s New NGO Law,” February 24, 2006 
(retrieved on June 5, 2007 from http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-50-10.cfm). Wood (2006) gives 
an overview of the cumbersome registration procedure for some foreign NGOs administered by the 
Federal Registration Service as a consequence of the amended NGO legislation.  
50 List retrieved on November 22, 2007 from the website of the Federal Registration Service at 
http://www.rosregistr.ru/docs/inko01.doc. All in all, approximately 500 foreign non-profit organizations 
are active in Russia, the number mentioned in an Interfax note “Russian Official Says To Continue 
registering NGOs After 18 Oct” (retrieved on June 5, 2007 from http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/ 2006-
211-5.cfm). 
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the development of democracy. In the subsequent section the most important (actual and 
potential) efficiency effects of these structural changes are assessed.51 
4.1 On the Progress of Democracy in Russia 
Constitutionalization is a still an ongoing process in transitional Russia. It is a process 
that is open to manipulation by various actors in society. The process was early on 
captured by Boris Yeltsin, who put his stamp on the version of the constitution that 
eventually was adopted in 1993. The constitutionalization process should be seen as part 
of a strive to establish Rule of Law in Russia. A significant fact, which is of some 
importance in a country undergoing rapid transitional changes, is that the constitution 
has remained in force without amendments since its adoption in 1993. Thus, it has 
contributed some degree of stability in an otherwise highly turbulent institutional 
development [C4]. Opting for semi-presidentialism, despite its inherent risks for conflict 
between the president, government, and parliament, was a decisive choice made early 
on in the constitutionalization process, a choice with important consequences for the 
continued Russian transitional development [C3]. It can reasonably be assumed that this 
choice was favoured and enforced by Gorbachev and later Yeltsin because they believed 
that perestroika and, subsequently, the dual transition to democracy and a market 
economy required a strong leader endowed with vast decision powers enabling the 
adoption of far-reaching and otherwise unattainable economic and political reforms. It 
is, however, fair to say that the Russian constitutionalization process in slow progress 
since the disintegration of the Soviet Union has strengthened the rule of law in the 
country [C5]. Much still remains to be done, however. The process, which has been 
mainly driven from the top, has made progress despite the fact that legal consciousness 
among ordinary Russian citizens has remained weak.  
Government. One of the set-backs of the Russian version of semi-presidentialism with 
vast powers bestowed upon the president,52 is that it tends to produce technical cabinets 
(in which ministerial appointments are not necessarily based on parliamentary majority) 
with limited ability to actually govern, to initiate and implement policies (Schleiter & 
Morgan-Jones, 2005; Sokolowski, 2003) [C3]. But this way of forming cabinets might 
nevertheless be efficient in situations where, as in Russia (before the December 1999 
elections), clear parliamentary majorities did not exist. Here, forming a cabinet based 
upon a (volatile) parliamentary majority might lead to government crisis. Furthermore, 
as some observers have suggested, countries like Russia and the Ukraine might “leave 
their dominant mode of technical governance behind as and when parties become 
sufficiently well organised and electoral mandates sufficiently conducive to the 
formation of assembly-based governments” (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2005).  
Political parties. A pertinent problem with the Russian party system has been that it 
tended to produce many small, short-lived parties with geographically very limited 
penetration. Developments after 1999, largely determined by institutional changes 
enacted by the president, have profoundly affected conditions for party life in Russia 
[C1]. With the emergence of parties of power the president was given a parliamentary 
                                                 
51 Whenever appropriate references to the criteria listed in Table 2 are noted in brackets [C?]. 
52 In Sedelius’ (2006) classification the Russian semi-presidentialist system is of a president-parliamen-
tary type. 
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platform, which might be used to support new reform proposals.53 Further changes in 
the electoral system, especially the recently raised threshold for parties’ entry to the 
parliament and the fact that all candidates can now only be elected through party lists, 
will have a clear impact on the work of political parties. The changed institutions will 
mean that political parties will become the main actors in the Russian political system, 
something that is likely eventually to produce more ideationally based policy dis-
cussions creating a foundation for real political opposition to the party of power, in the 
end improving political accountability and hopefully stimulating popular participation 
in politics, thus changing the currently widespread passivity among the Russian 
electorate, what Evans (2002) has called the “postcommunist syndrome.” While many 
commentators have been critical towards Putin’s reforms of the electoral system, some 
have, however, expressed a guarded optimism concerning their effects on democracy 
(cf., for instance, Hale, 2005; Willerton, Beznosov & Carrier, 2005; Moraski, 2007).  
Federalism. While Yeltsin might have saved the Russian Federation from disinte-
gration by different concessions to the regions (e.g., through bilateral treaties 
differentiating various benefits between the regions), his policy failed to eliminate a 
number of asymmetries which were potentially threatening the survival of the 
federation.54 Through a series of often harsh measures president Putin has eliminated 
many of these asymmetries thus strengthening federal state power and installing more 
orderly and transparent relations between the federal centre and the regions [C3, C4]. In 
the process, it has been objected, the regions have lost some of their independence. But 
this, as supporters of the reforms would argue, might still be a necessary sacrifice for 
the purpose of establishing a federal power structure allowing a more stable and 
efficient policymaking. 
Elections. While the existence of regularly recurring free elections must be recognized 
as an important step in the establishment of Russia as a democratic nation, it must also 
be remembered that the conditions under which these elections take place are of even 
greater importance for the development of good governance [C2]. Elections in Russia 
are (still) subjected to various manipulations producing a system that has been labelled 
“supply-side democracy.” In such a system parties and candidates for political office do 
not emerge in response to popular demand, but rather as a result of actions taken by 
members of Russian elite groupings. Incumbents’ power and the administrative 
resources that incumbents command often seem to determine actual election outcomes 
(so-called machine politics). One avenue of manipulative action of special importance 
for influencing election outcomes operates via biased media output content [C2]. Parties 
in power and incumbent candidates are favoured by manipulations performed by 
“election technologists” influencing the media, often using kompromat to discredit 
political opponents.  
Media. With perestroika, media in Russia were given freedom to discuss topics that had 
hitherto been forbidden leading to a critical scrutiny of the many new developments 
                                                 
53 Smyth (2002) explains how the parliamentary situation under Putin, unlike that of his predecessor, 
could produce support from the party of power (Unity/United Russia) for presidential reform proposals. 
54 As Hahn (2005:153) notes: “Yeltsin’s emerging federal state included at least three major forms of 
federative ‘asymmetry’, a complexity unprecedented in the annals of federalism, ‘official asymmetry’ or 
constitutionally based treaty federalism, ‘unofficial asymmetry’ between federal and regional laws and 
constitutions, and the ‘administrative-structural’ asymmetry of Russia’s nested or matryoshka national 
territorial subdivisions.” 
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appearing in Russian society [C2]. But media were soon “occupied” by the oligarchs 
who reintroduced a new set of restrictions hampering free journalism. This situation 
also changed when authorities (with sanction from the president) started harassing the 
media moguls until they eventually sold their media outlets, once again opening the 
media to administrative control. Political forces, not least the president, could again use 
media to influence how Russian citizens cast their votes in elections. Studies have 
indicated that media coverage of election campaigns have had a clear influence on 
election outcomes. In addition, media workers trying to do honest work today risk 
losing their jobs or are being physically threatened, even killed. Thus, the media 
situation in Russia seems to have deteriorated in comparison with what it was at the 
beginning of the transition. Letting this situation prevail is, as Fish (2006) has observed, 
a violation of the Russian constitution with its guarantees of freedom of speech and 
information. Biased media reporting affects actors’ political behaviour and results in 
different decisions from those that would have been taken had information about events 
and discussion on political issues been produced by media less affected by outside 
actors. President Putin has acknowledged the problems and vowed to take actions to 
improve the safety of media workers and enhance media’s independence from outside 
forces (CPJ, 2007). However, it remains to be seen if this commitment will also make 
any positive real impact on the precarious media situation.  
Civil society. As has often been noted, especially by foreign observers of the Russian 
transition, the development of an efficiently functioning democratic political market 
would be greatly facilitated by a well-developed civil society [C1]. However, a number 
of assessments have concluded that Russian civil society is still notoriously weak, 
despite a rapid development at the beginning of the transition period. Many have 
blamed the problems of civil society development on presidential policies to rein in and 
control the activity of civic organizations. The Russian authorities claim that the activity 
of many civic organizations is not positive for society and is performed under the 
influence of foreign funders with those funders’ interests in mind. Like in many other 
areas of Russian society the authorities have tried to handle the situation by introducing 
various administrative restrictions. A recent example is the requirement that some 
NGOs and NCOs must be reregistered with the authorities in order to be able to 
lawfully continue their work ― a requirement that these organizations have claimed 
might threaten their continued activity. In a statist perspective on Russian state-society 
relations, it is perhaps not very surprising that the authorities attempt to get a firmer grip 
on developments by making the rule system governing civil society activities more 
stringent and seeking to improve the transparency of NGO funding.  
Another problem that has hampered the influence of civil society on Russian 
policymaking has to do with the opportunities for civil society organizations to 
communicate their views and influence actual policymaking. Henry (2006) has 
distinguished three types of civic organizations; those based on professionals’ skills, 
those based on grass-root engagement, and those emanating from, and with remaining 
close ties to, government circles. For the last category of organizations access to 
government officials (and funding) is not the main problem. For the other two 
categories, however, mechanisms for exchanging views and channelling ideas which 
could influence policymaking are still poorly developed. As Taylor (2006) has noted, 
the “possibility of a more positive relationship of mutual assistance and partnership 
between the state and civil society” is nowadays increasingly emphasized in the 
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literature (cf. for instance, Johnson, 2006; McIntosh Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). Civil 
society should not only serve as a watchdog of the government, but also as a resource. 
In fact, as Weigle (2002) has argued, Russian civil society organizations rather see a 
strong state as a prerequisite for a strong society and necessary for civil society 
development. In this conception, civil society is “vital to ensuring the state’s democratic 
orientation.”  
Considering these problems and the attitude held by Russian civil society organizations 
towards state-society relations, many of the measures initiated in recent years by 
President Putin must be seen as an acknowledgement of the importance of civil society 
for the further social and political development in Russia. Despite the still limited evi-
dence it seems that the work of the Public Chamber has a potential to positively 
stimulate state-society relations, and the significantly increased government financial 
support of civic organizations indicates recognition of their importance for a continued 
democratic development in Russia.  
But even more importantly, it seems that despite the recent bureaucratic obstacles 
hampering their functioning, Russian civil society organizations are capable of crea-
tively adapting to the situation by modifying their behaviour and finding new organiza-
tional forms for acting and collaborating with one another with a purpose of influencing 
developments in society. Henry (2006) notes that a new “green” political party was 
established in 2005 by members of various environmental organizations in an effort to 
gain access to policy formulation since nothing previously tried seemed to work.55 
Taylor (2006) offers another interesting example of new forms of state-civil society 
collaboration in Russia. He reports on the emerging “street-level” collaboration between 
NGOs and law enforcement authorities in a strategy that “targets lower levels of state 
agencies, and tries to work inside state bureaucracies or alongside state officials per-
forming their normal functions.”  
In summary, it could be noted that a number of reforms adopted since the beginning of 
the transition have made a clear impact on the structure of the Russian political market. 
Arguably, many of the institutional changes that have been introduced through these 
reforms have modified the structure of the political system, resulting in improved 
prerequisites for a further development of democracy in Russia.  
4.2 On the Development of Efficiency in the Russian Political Market 
While it seems that the reforms affecting the structure of the political system have 
improved the prerequisites for democracy in Russia by levelling the playing field in 
which political market interaction takes place, the question remains whether these 
improvements have made any impact on the way the game is played. Is it possible to 
say anything about the extent (if at all) to which the reforms discussed above have 
improved the prerequisites for increased efficiency by facilitating reduced transaction 
costs incurred in exchanges taking place in the Russian political market?  
                                                 
55 With some 20 thousand members the new party decided (in April 2006) to enter “Yabloko” forming a 
green fraction, the purpose being to prevail on the political arena hoping to make an impact in the 
upcoming (December 2007) parliamentary elections.  
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According to North (as noted in Section 1), four features determine these transaction 
costs: (1) costs of measuring the attributes of the goods and services that are exchanged; 
(2) the size of the market and whether exchange is personal or impersonal; (3) the need 
for enforcement of contracts; and (4) ideology or the “mental models” with the help of 
which individuals explain and evaluate decision options.  
After reformulating North’s four “determining features” to suit political markets we 
take a brief look at some reforms that could be expected to produce an impact on the 
transaction costs encountered in political market interaction. We indicate what we 
believe are positive effects of these reforms and note some remaining problems that the 
reforms did not solve. 
(1) Structural reforms introducing formal rules that facilitate citizens’ assessment of 
the character and political programs of various market actors (politicians, bureau-
crats), rules that facilitate citizens’ decisions whether or not to support an actor or 
group of actors (e.g., a political party), tend to decrease transaction costs in the politi-
cal market.  
The fact that in the last 6–7 years a certain stability has been introduced in the legal 
framework (the formal institutional set-up) has facilitated citizens’ understanding of the 
structure and functioning of the Russian political market and might have contributed to 
decreased transaction costs. 
Easy access to comprehensive and accurate information about developments in all 
spheres of society is decisive for citizens’ ability to assess the character and political 
programs of various actors in the political market. This kind of information is typically 
provided by mass media. Formally, the freedom of expression and media are secured 
through stipulations in the Russian Constitution (Article 29) and through the Law on the 
Mass Media (N 2124-I) adopted in 1991 and subsequently amended several times, a law 
that Richter (2005) found to be “one of Russia’s most liberal laws and one of the 
world’s most advanced laws regulating the field.” In practice, however, media freedom 
has been increasingly circumscribed, especially during Putin’s reign. When media can-
not be trusted to disseminate accurate information, the road is opened for manipulative 
and corrupt practices influencing public opinion and, eventually, actual political 
behaviour, contributing to decreased efficiency in transactions conducted in the Russian 
political market.  
A stable party structure with political parties that are defined on the basis of ideological 
consensus and have organizational presence in most parts of the federation would also 
make it easier for citizens’ to make well-informed political choices. The recently intro-
duced changes in electoral rules raising the threshold for admittance to the parliament 
and demanding that all candidates be elected via party lists may force the Russian party 
structure onto such a development path. But this still remains to be seen.  
(2) Structural reforms aiming at increasing the size of the political market, making the 
political market more impersonal, will tend to increase efficiency (through a decrease 
in transaction costs).  
The fact that legislative acts valid for various territorial levels (federal, regional, local) 
have been harmonized and made more consistent is likely to make interactions more 
impersonal and efficient not only in economic markets but also in the political market.  
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Election to the federal Duma entirely based on voting for candidates named on national 
party lists, as is to be held for the first time in December 2007, will increase the size of 
the Russian political market and make exchange more impersonal. The common 
practice in previous elections to have half of the parliamentary candidates elected from 
single member districts made personal relations important and elections were more open 
to manipulation by incumbents using administrative resources to their own benefit and 
large corporations providing financial support for candidates they preferred.56  
Through the new law “On political parties” adopted in 2001 several changes in the rules 
governing funding of political parties were introduced. Some of the changes, such as 
limits on donations and opening of parties’ accounts to public scrutiny, should 
contribute to making the political market more impersonal and transparent, thus 
contributing to increased efficiency. However, according to Kenneth Wilson (2007), 
there have hardly been any noticeable effects of the reform, it “has not appreciably 
reduced parties’ donor dependence, nor has it rendered party finance transparent; it has 
also clearly failed to solve the problems of corruption.”  
(3) Structural reforms aiming at facilitating enforcement of contracts would mean, if 
translated into the realm of politics, reforms improving accountability, i.e., citizens’ 
right and capacity to assign responsibility for failures or malperformance of an 
individual politician or a political party.  
The main vehicle for political accountability is the existence of regularly recurring free 
elections to various political assemblies. In the Russian transition free elections are 
guaranteed in the constitution, and regular free elections have indeed been held. But, 
since the elections have not been entirely fair, accountability has suffered to some extent 
with due consequences for efficiency.  
The constitutionalization process, with the constitution prevailing without change for 
quite some time, is arguably very important for the continued growth of law and order 
in the Russian society and contributing to a gradual improvement in people’s legal 
consciousness. This development tends to increase social trust, a factor of great 
importance for the efficiency of actors’ behaviour in the political market.  
Measures have also been introduced to strengthen state power and the judiciary with the 
intention to reduce arbitrariness in citizens’ interaction with representatives of the state 
bureaucracy and in various kinds of disputes that are referred to the judiciary. These are 
also reforms that potentially improve social trust and the efficiency of the Russian 
political market.  
One way to increase the accountability of the Russian government (which is currently 
appointed by the president) and to make it better equipped to perform its policymaking 
duties would be to make the selection of its members reflect the majority situation in the 
Duma. This issue has long been a recurring theme in Russian political discourse and in 
his presidential addresses to the Federation Council the president has indicated that 
changes in the appointment of cabinet members along these lines might be made in the 
future (Mikhailovskaya, 2003). The recent move by president Putin to head United 
                                                 
56 The use of administrative resources (machine politics) has also been further regulated through recent 
legislative changes (cf., Dimenko, 2007), a structural reform that, in principle, adds formal support to a 
more efficient political behaviour. Whether this reform will actually change behaviour and reduce 
transaction costs in the Russian political market remains to be seen.  
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Russia’s list of parliamentary candidates in the upcoming (December 2007) Duma 
election might perhaps be a first step in an attempt to introduce a government based 
upon parliamentary majority ― with United Russia as the party in absolute majority and 
Putin as prime minister.57  
A better state control over executive assemblies’ financial management ― for instance, 
in the form of improved budgetary control ― would be an effective way of increasing 
accountability, thereby stimulating more efficient patron-client relations in the Russian 
political market.  
Despite much talk about the detrimental effects of corruption not enough has been done 
to reduce its scope and limit its highly negative effects on the efficiency of the Russian 
political market (cf., for instance, Cheloukhine & King, 2007).  
(4) Structural reforms aimed at improving individual and collective learning ultimately 
resulting in changed (shared) mental models (ideology), with the help of which actors 
interpret their situation and decide on future actions, may contribute to a more efficient 
political behaviour (reduced transaction costs). Such behaviour might lead to ― and 
might even constitute ― institutional change, in case the new behaviour is not 
compatible with existing institutions guiding a particular behaviour.  
Individual perceptions about the fairness and justice of the rules of the game obviously 
affect actors’ performance in the political market. If everyone agrees on current policies 
and the general political outlook is more or less embraced by all citizens, shared mental 
models (ideology) will remain stable and social trust will be high. If, however, many 
citizens do not agree on the political path followed by the governing bodies of the 
country then tensions will stimulate discourse and possibly result in new (individual and 
organizational) learning suggesting new ways of approaching and solving problems, 
something that might eventually lead to the establishment of new shared mental models 
(ideology) and institutional change.  
Ideology so conceived cannot be said to have remained stable in Russia during 
transition. Admittedly, the constitution has not changed since its adoption in 1993, 
meaning that the basic formal rules establishing the country’s mode of governance have 
not been seriously challenged, a fact that no doubt is important for the efficient 
workings of the political market. However, and this seems to be a more representative 
characteristic of the Russian transition especially in its first decade, a large portion of 
the total legislative body has been in a kind of constant turmoil with detrimental effects 
for market efficiency (in economic as well as political markets). And, moreover, 
informal institutions have been even more unstable, as witnessed by the way people 
work around many formal rules, such as the tax legislation, to take but one example.  
                                                 
57 The announcement at United Russia’s congress on October 1, 2007 that President Putin was to head the 
party’s electoral list triggered a flood of often critical or apprehensive comments in the Russian press and 
in media reports all over the world. Both Russian and western commentators saw the move as a way for 
Putin to remain in power after his second term in office ends in March 2008. While Russian 
commentators often discussed pros and cons for the country and for Putin himself of the spectacular 
decision, western commentators mostly noted that Putin had decided to remain in power through means 
that in principle sidestepped democratic procedure and confirmed that Russia is once again ruled by one 
man; see, for instance, Stanovaia (2007); Mikheev (2007); Volkov & Rudakov (2007); Levy (2007); 
Ludwig (2007).  
 40
Taken together, the impression purveyed by the highly volatile institutions in Russia is 
that of a society in which there is a great deal of ideological confusion (mental models 
tend to be shared by a few) creating a situation where new patterns of behaviour, new 
approaches to solving common problems, are constantly elaborated and “tested.” 
Compared to older well-established market democracies Russia displays a rapid 
ideological development resulting in rapid institutional changes. While such fast and 
often erratic developments tend to increase transaction costs (reduce efficiency) in the 
short term, it is nevertheless indispensable for devising improved (more efficient) 
institutions.  
What structural features in society can foster the emergence of broadly shared mental 
models that would make Russian society more ideologically coherent and ultimately 
contribute to increased efficiency in the Russian political market? What reforms 
affecting this structure have been introduced already, and with what success? Some 
reforms discussed above are likely to have an impact in this respect. For instance, the 
recently introduced changes in the electoral rules are expected to invigorate Russian 
political parties. Parties are likely to become more prominent players in politics, which 
eventually should make it more attractive for people to enrol as party members. With 
more people active in party politics the process of forging ideological consensus should 
be stimulated. Likewise, support of other civic organizations in Russia could be 
expected to stimulate political discourse, in the end establishing a structure conducive to 
a more active popular participation in public policymaking. If such a process is allowed 
to emerge in an orderly manner without being obstructed by the authorities it should 
lead to an improved efficiency in the workings of the Russian political market.58 This 
would mean a modernization of Russian political culture that would increase trust in 
society and hopefully reduce the “postcommunist syndrome” preventing people from 
engaging in Russian public affairs.  
Here it should also be noted that measures affecting the situation in other spheres of 
society than politics might also produce an impact on ideology and ultimately the 
efficiency of the political market. Reforms aiming at improving social welfare 
(reduction of poverty, improved health care, better education, etc.) are examples of such 
measures. 
Naturally, this reasoning about possible effects on the efficiency of the Russian political 
market resulting from the structural reforms discussed above is only valid under the 
assumption that the reforms actually are, or will be, properly implemented with the 
purpose of achieving the effects stated. That this is, or will be, the case is, however, far 
from certain. Developments in Russia after the December 2007 Duma and the March 
2008 presidential elections will begin to reveal whether the observed and planned 
structural reforms of the Russian political market will actually produce the intended 
effects.  
                                                 
58 As noted above, the Russian authorities’ stance on the issue of civil society has been somewhat 
ambiguous. But, judging from recent statements by the president, for instance in his 2007 presidential 
address (cf., Putin, 2007), interactions with Russian civil society is considered very important for the 
development of democracy and NGOs are this year given significantly increased financial support.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This article has outlined a way to assess efficiency changes in Russian politics. 
Conceptualizing the problem in an institutional framework, as suggested by Douglass 
North et al., led to the application of the market metaphor to political life and to seeing 
changes in transaction costs as an indication of the efficiency of actors’ political 
behaviour. As is the case with economic markets, the efficiency of actors’ behaviour in 
political markets is determined not only by the quality of the existing set of rules 
(formal and informal institutions) that restrict actors’ behaviour, but also by actors’ 
perception and understanding of these rules and the behavioural decisions they take on 
that basis. Thus, it was argued, the efficiency of actors’ behaviour in the political market 
is determined both by the structure established by the existing institutions and by actors’ 
perception and understanding of the restrictions imposed on their actions by these 
institutions. While the structure of the rule system limits the potential efficiency of 
actors’ behaviour in the political market, learning is the fundamental factor determining 
actors’ ability to actually use the efficiency potential offered by the institutional 
structure. Consequently, in order to assess efficiency changes in actors’ political 
behaviour it is essential to analyze the structural changes as well as changes in agency 
that take place in the political market. Based on Robert Dahl’s (1971) reasoning on what 
characterizes democratic governance a set of criteria was specified for assessing the 
character of changes that are believed to affect the political market.  
In the second part of the article, an analysis was made of the structural changes that 
have taken place in the Russian political market since the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. Here we turn back to the original questions set out in the introduction above and 
summarize the answers found in our analysis.  
5.1 Is the Russian Political Market Democratic and Efficient? 
The first question we set ourselves (cf., Section 2.4) was: To what extent are the criteria 
listed in Table 2 met in contemporary Russia? The results of the analysis performed can 
be summarized in the following way: 
1. Formal rules do exist as expressed in legislation (mainly the constitution) through 
which a clear structure of the Russian political market is specified. A division of power 
between various state agencies is laid down in the constitution; the adopted mode of 
government ― semi-presidentialism ― bestows major powers upon the president [C3]. 
Dahl’s criteria concerning citizens’ freedoms and rights [C1] and the sanction of certain 
procedures and resources in society [C2] all find their correspondence in the Russian 
constitution.  
2. The existing Russian constitutional rules compare well with corresponding rules 
derived from an “ideal-type” definition of democracy [C1-C4], provided that such an 
“ideal-type” definition is seen as compatible with different forms of democratic gover-
nance, such as parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism.  
3. The structure of the Russian political market that was established through the formal 
rules laid down in the constitution (and in subsequent legislation) has remained stable 
since its adoption in 1993. However, since the formally adopted rules were often 
overridden or affected by the influence of informal rules, the formal structure of the 
Russian political market did not work entirely according to the letter of the law [C5]. 
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For example, while elections are considered free in Russia, they are not considered fair, 
due to manipulations of information disseminated through the media.  
Furthermore, in practice, the very powerful president has frequently interfered with and 
modified the set of formal rules that constitutes the structure of the Russian political 
market. While this interference in Yeltsin’s term in office was achieved mostly through 
decrees, policies initiated by Putin and the government have increasingly been enacted 
through legislation passed through the parliament (Remington, 2006). For instance, in 
the last few years, changes have been introduced that have reduced many of the incon-
sistencies that were frequent in the existing legislation [C4]. The president has also 
initiated and sanctioned changes in electoral rules that can be expected to profoundly 
affect the existence and activity of Russian political parties. These institutional changes 
will presumably increase the importance of party politics in Russia, thereby promoting 
citizens’ engagement in political life. Ideally, the reforms will increase political ac-
countability and open opportunities for making government appointments better reflect 
parliamentary majorities [C3].  
However, while many of these changes (on paper) seem to promote democracy (in-
crease peoples’ opportunities to influence policymaking), criticism has also been 
mounted against some features of the reforms and their expected effects. A common 
denominator of this criticism seems to be suspicions that the real purpose of the reforms 
introduced is not in fact to improve democracy in Russia, but rather to strengthen the 
existing elite’s (or ruling clan’s) grasp of economic and political power, i.e., actually to 
prevent a further development of democracy.  
This clearly illustrates the problem of studying developments in today’s Russia. While a 
study of the changing structure of the political market would give fairly clear 
indications of the actual functioning of the system in a country with a well-developed 
democratic market economic system, it is not obvious that similar conclusions can be 
made on the basis of a corresponding analysis of the political market in transitional 
Russia. Here informal institutions incompatible or at serious odds with formally adopted 
legislation influence actors’ behaviour to an extent that might pervert the intended 
behavioural effects of the formal institutions. This fact only underlines the importance 
of analyzing agency and not only structure when trying to understand developments in 
transitional Russia.  
5.2 Value of the Criteria as a Tool for Assessment 
The second question set out in Section 2.4 was: To what extent do our criteria work as a 
general tool for assessing political markets?  
Employing the market metaphor to conceptualize interactions in the political system 
automatically draws attention to the issue of which characteristics determine the quality 
of actors’ political behaviour. The principal benefit of the economic “market mecha-
nism” is that it ― at least in theory ― entails an incentive structure that tends to make 
actors engage in transactions through which scarce resources are allocated to their best 
use. But, as North (1990) has pointed out, traditional neoclassical theory needs to be 
supplemented by a theory of institutions and transaction costs. An efficiently 
functioning economic market operates at minimum transaction costs. The institutional 
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framework embedding market interactions can be more or less conducive to minimizing 
transaction costs.  
One might ask what features determine the efficiency of transactions in the political 
market. Here we have suggested that the transaction costs that actors incur in their 
interactions in the political market to a significant extent depend upon the quality 
(structure) of the institutional framework in which this interaction is embedded and 
upon the degree to which the behaviour (agency) entailed by the existing institutions are 
enforced (regardless of whether enforcement is coercive or voluntary). As North (1990: 
364) claims, “different institutional frameworks will result in different costs of political 
exchange.”  
In the Russian transitional setting ― where the undemocratic Soviet command economy 
is giving way to a democratic market system ― the criteria to be used for assessing the 
efficiency of the political market had to prescribe both structural and behavioural 
characteristics of an efficiently functioning democracy. The criteria selected (cf., Table 
2) were framed in institutional terms.  
With reference to the question posed above, it can be concluded that, at least within the 
present problem context, the criteria specified have been useful both for selecting which 
structural political reforms to analyze and for assessing the quality of the institutional 
changes introduced through these reforms, for determining whether or not they have 
improved ― or (if not yet implemented) have the potential to improve ― the structural 
prerequisites for a more efficient interaction in the Russian political market.  
However, to allow a more general conclusion about the merits of our approach, the 
criteria also need to be tested in a wider problem context, where not only the structural 
prerequisites for political market efficiency are investigated, but where actors’ real 
market behaviour is also assessed. Thus, both structural and agency changes should be 
addressed to finally ascertain the quality of this assessment tool.  
5.3 Disentangling the Russian Political Jumble 
Many features of the Russian political market are still insufficiently known. Based on 
the previous discussion, it would seem particularly fruitful to study the following issues 
in the nearest future, when several of the recent reforms affecting the political market 
may start to make an impact on real politics in Russia.  
First of all, it is important to understand how political power is connected to economic 
power in Russia. An analysis of how relations between political and economic elite 
groupings change and what determines such changes would contribute to such an under-
standing.  
As was observed above, the Russian constitutionalization process (the introduction of 
Rule of Law) is heavily dependent upon the development of legal consciousness among 
citizens. In a more general context, this is an issue that is closely related to political 
culture. In an action research perspective it would be interesting to study how policy 
reforms affecting the development of democracy in Russia are initiated and elaborated. 
How can citizen participation in democratic policy formulation processes be stimulated 
in a system where citizens’ legal consciousness is weak and where long political culture 
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traditions have assigned the policy formulation privilege to members of the elite? What 
is required to change this situation?  
In a more immediate perspective research ought to focus on the effects of the recently 
introduced reforms. How will the reforms, especially reforms of the electoral system, 
affect the Russian party system? How will recent reforms affect civil society and 
possibilities for increased popular interest in and influence on politics? How will the 
reforms affect the relation between the federal, regional and local levels? How will the 
president’s position and influence on Russian political life be affected by the reforms? 
And, more specifically, how (if at all) will the reforms change the relations between the 
presidency, the legislature and government? Is Russia in fact moving towards 
parliamentary rule?59  
In general, we still know far too little about the interdependence between structure and 
agency in the political market, how actors’ behaviour depends upon changed structures 
and how changes in the structure depend upon actors’ behaviour. The continued Russian 
transition offers a good arena for studying these and similar issues.  
Finally, there is a very serious issue that deserves much more attention than it has 
hitherto been given. This is the issue of corruption, an issue that might impose a 
completely different perspective on the whole Russian transitional development. It is 
generally agreed that corruption is a major problem in Russian society, and officials, not 
least the president, constantly acknowledge the problem and state that serious measures 
will be taken to fight corruption. However, corruption might, as has been suggested by, 
for instance, Brovkin (1998) and more recently by Stefes (2006) and Cheloukhine and 
King (2007), be a much more fundamental feature affecting all levels of life in Russia 
than has been noted so far. If the authors’ claims are corroborated, research about devel-
opments in Russia might have to be conducted on entirely different premises than has 
been the case until this day.  
Mats-Olov Olsson 
Umeå, 30 November 2007 
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